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This thesis analyzes Soviet arms transfer policies
within the Warsaw Treaty Organization relative to three
perspectives; political and diplomatic, strategic and
military, and economic. The political and diplomatic per-
spective emphasizes political control and maximization of
Soviet influence as a primary rationale for Soviet arms
transfers. The strategic and military perspective emphasizes
military power and the maximization of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization's military potential as an alliance. The
economic perspective focuses on the Soviet military-
industrial complex and internal decision-making as a factor
in arms transfers.
The inter-relationship of these three perspectives
defines the objectives and limitations of Soviet arms
transfers within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The
thesis concludes that the quality of Soviet arms transferred
to the WTO will always be at least a generation behind those
equipping Soviet forces and that East European license pro-
duction will only be of equipment that is relatively obso-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ARMS SALES RATIONALES
Over the last decade increased research has focused on
arms sales and the implications of security assistance.
Studies have been initiated on superpower transfers to the
Third World and related influence, recipient and supplier
rationales for the transfer of arms, and the development
of Third World arms suppliers. Within this body of theoreti-
cal and empirical work seemingly little has been done con-
cerning the Soviet-Eastern Europe arms connection. This
thesis will study Soviet security assistance to Eastern
Europe from three separate vantage points: Political/
Diplomatic; Strategic/Military; and Economic [Ref. 1J
.
The Political/Diplomatic perspective asserts Soviet
military assistance is an instrument of Soviet control of
Eastern Europe. Through the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) , the Soviet Union minimizes the political flexibility
of member states by decreasing the capability of the mili^
tary to support national policy. Christopher Jones states
that
Moscow and its proteges in the Eastern European
parties together prevent the defense ministries
of the loyal Eastern European states from adopt-
ing military strategies which would greatly limit
the Soviet capabilities for intervention against
local anti-communist forces. [Ref. 2
J
In this view, the WTO is primarily a means of indirect
control of the East European nations and only secondarily a
8

collective security organization. The fighting capabilities
of the WTO will always be secondary to Soviet concerns over
the independence of the separate military ministries and the
soveriegnty entailed. The national means of resistance is
limited through increased dependence upon the Soviet defense
system.
The strategic/military perspective is supported primarily
by the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union V.S.
Kulikov, First Deputy of the USSR Minister of Defense and
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact
Member States, notes: "common goals of armed defense of
socialist achievements by collective efforts by the brother
peoples and their armies comprise the military strategy
foundation of the fighting alliance of socialist countries."
He continues that "the socialist mode of production and
public ownership of the means of production which prevail
in the allied countries [WTO] form the economic basis of
our community. This unifies the socialist countries and
finds expression in selfless cooperation and mutual assist-
ance among the Warsaw Pact nations." Marshal Kulikov stresses
the collective nature, selfless cooperation and mutual assist-
ance among the member states. The picture developed by
Russian writings on the WTO depicts a coalition of national
armies with the shared goal of protecting the socialist gains:
each member selflessly supplying what assistance is neces-
sary for the betterment of the coalition as a whole iRef . 3]
.

Due to secrecy within the Soviet Bloc concerning the
functioning of the military industrial complex, little has
been written on the economic considerations of Soviet East
European transfers. Marshall I. Goldman points to the failure
of the Soviet economic system but excludes the military
branch. Goldman states: "Not only does the Soviet Union
produce large quantities of traditional heavy arms equipment,
but unlike the civilian industry, it generally produces good
quality, and often innovative military products as well."
The success of the military side over the civilian sector
lies, according to Goldman, in the priority and bonuses
afforded the military/industrial complex [Ref . 4 J . Goldman
notes:
Managers in the military industry, unlike their
counterparts in the civilian world, are provided
with more flexibility, more capital and more skilled
labor. The Soviets seem to gather together the best
specialists and engineers and assign them to special
military factories and provide them with special
housing and other material privileges. [Ref. 5J
This produces a privileged class whose position rests on the
strength of the military-industrial complex. Eastern Europe
provides a market for Soviet arms and thereby helps justify
the need for a large military-industrial capability.
In viewing Soviet-East European arms transfers from the
Political/Diplomatic, Strategic/Military and Economic per-
spectives, this study will attempt to determine the validity
of the perspectives, their inter-relationships, and their
effects on Soviet WTO arms assistance. The thesis is that
these rationales do fit Soviet East European arms assistance
10

but not in the same fashion as in the West. The control of
the political system over all facets of society coupled with
the centralized nature of the economic system change the
political-economic structure within which the rationales
operate. All major decisions and policy formulations are
made by the eleven to fifteen members of the Politburo.
Any influence on the decision-making process must be made
through these members. External interests have little sway
over policy. Concurrent with this, access to the political
process, political power, and special status, are the rewards
within the system. The ability to gain admittance to special
stores, travel abroad or own a "dacha" are determined by
one's status. The relative status positions are determined
by the political system not economic or educational standings
Considering the structural environment, the three rationales
are operative but function under different criteria. The
economic imperative of the defense complex is not concerned
with corporate profit as in the West but with maintenance
of its position as a privileged sector within the economy.
The military imperatives are concerned not with the main-
tenance of a traditional alliance but with the utilization
of East Europe as a defensive zone for the Soviet Union.
The political imperative is the removal of a national means
of resistance in Eastern Europe and the subsequent under-*-
mining of East European national sovereignty.
11

B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND PRECONCEPTIONS
Availability of accurate data is an ongoing problem in
any study of arms transfers. Contradictions from year to
year concerning Soviet arms transfers exist in all major
publications. The data in this thesis is derived from SIPRI
publications, the IISS Military Balance
, Jane's publications,
U.S. Defense Department unclassified reports, and various
articles, in an attempt to provide as complete and accurate
a data base as possible. Even so, the information is sketchy
and some contradictions may exist.
The primary preconception at the initiation of research
on this thesis was that the WTO functions as an instrument
of Soviet control. Though this perception is still held,
there is a realistic military function to the WTO that
should not be overlooked. Soviet policy is based upon con-
trol, but the utilization of Eastern European military power
is also a Soviet concern.
In researching the three imperatives of Soviet arms
transfers to Eastern Europe various techniques were used.
Chapter II, focusing on political/diplomatic imperatives,
uses a set of eleven factors to guide research and establish
relative influence levels between the WTO states. This chapter
demonstrates that Soviet arms transfer policies decrease the
national means of resistance and increase Soviet influence.
Chapter III, the military/strategic imperatives, studies the
WTO and armament policies from the perspective of a tradi-
tional alliance. This chapter demonstrates that the
12

non-Soviet members of the WTO are not equal partners with
the Soviet Union. East European military potential is only
allowed to develop to the degree that it augments Soviet
defensive capabilities and not the defense requirements of
the individual nation-states. Chapter IV, the economic
imperatives, demonstrates the existance of a military-indus-
trial complex within the Soviet Union. This complex, through
access to political elites, uses Eastern Europe as a closed
arms market which then justifies the need for a large military-
industrial sector. The last chapter, Chapter V, reviews the
findings of the study and concludes that little change can
be expected in Soviet arms transfer policies to Eastern Europe
Soviet imperatives require the subordination of East European





Indigenous defense production is an expression
of national sovereignty. A responsibility for the
government of any state is to ensure survival of
its citizenry, and local production of arms is one
of many instrumentalities for fulfilling that
responsibility. To be sure, the degree to which
indigenous defense production contributes to secur-
ing national survival is constrained by the resources
at a state's disposal, its technological sophisti-
cation, and a host of other factors. Often, other
instrumentalities such as diplomatic positioning,
economic vitality, or even arms purchases are more
important than indigenous defense production for
sustaining national integrity.
Nevertheless, if most states could provide for
their own survival through local defense produc-
tion, they would, and it is clear that many states
want some form of this capability, even if it is
only symbolic, as a sign of their national
sovereignty. [Ref. 6]
This statement by Michael Moodie underscores the rela-
tionship between national sovereignty and defense produc-
tion. In practical terms, military self-sufficiency removes
any possibility of manipulation of defense requirements
by a second state. Defense decisions can be solely based on
internal constraints with no regard for the economic or
political vacillation of a supplier state. Psychologically,
self-sufficiency produces self-confidence within the
leadership and the population. The nation-state is provid-
ing for its own security without having to be dependent or
thankful to a big brother state. The ability to provide for
one's own security is a major factor of national sovereignty
14

Soviet policies in relation to security assistance with-
in the WTO have worked to undercut the national sovereignty
of the member nations. Through the guise of standardization
and specialization, the Soviet Union has established con-
trol of the defense-industrial bases of the WTO members.
Standardization induces the member states to acquire the
same equipment to enhance the compatibility and efficiency
of the WTO armies. Specialization requires the efficient
organization of defense industry within the WTO to maximize
the effects of comparative advantage. Then, with her large
military industrial capabilities, the Soviet Union dominates
armament design and production within the alliance. Con-
trolling the armament requirements, production, and flow,
has allowed the Soviet Union to establish long term influ-
ence over the WTO states. Their national means of resistance
is limited through increased reliance upon the Soviet defense
system. The actual influence is exerted not by the threat
of termination of Soviet assistance, but by the lack of a
national means of resistance in the face of overbearing
Soviet military power.
Table I is a list of supplier influence indices derived
from Ann Hessing Cahn's eleven factors of influence maximi-
zation [Ref. 7]. The Soviet East European arms connection
will be studied relative to these eleven indices to demon-
strate the effect of Soviet assistance upon the national
defense posture of the WTO states. The eleven factors pro-
vide two analytical functions. First, they provide a
15

framework of indices that reflect the relevant issues con-
cerning arms transfers and influence. By researching the
eleven indices relative to the Soviet Union and the WTO a
clearer picture of the WTO defense establishment can be
determined. Secondly, the assignment of values to each of
the eleven factors creates a chart indicating Soviet influ-
ence trend levels among the WTO members. For this study,
values were assigned in the following manner:
"++"
- highly in favor of the Soviet Union. The
effect of this factor upon the recipient
functions to maximize Soviet influence potential
"+"
- in favor of the U.S.S.R. This factor favors
Soviet influence potential but to a lesser
degree than "++"
"0"
- neutral factor. Does not maximize or decrease
Soviet influence potential
"-"
- in favor of the recipient, decreases Soviet
influence potential
"—
" - highly in favor of the recipient. Functions
as reverse influence upon the Soviet Union.
Once assigned, the values will indicate rough trends of
Soviet influence potential which then can be verified
against actual foreign policy initiatives of the WTO member
states. The lower the national means of defense, the
higher the correlation should be between WTO member states
'
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Derived from Ann Hessing Chan's "United Arms to the Middle
East 1967-1976; a Critical Examination," Great Power Inter-
vention in the Middle East edited by Milton Leitenberg and
Gabriel Sheffer, Pergamon Press 19 79, p. 111.
++ = highly in favor of USSR; + = in favor of USSR; = neutral;
= in favor of recipient; — = reverse influence over USSR.
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Soviet arms transfers are intended to lower the national
means of defense, then this objective should be reflected
in many of the individual indices and in the overall trend
developed within Table I.
B. STRATEGIC LOCATION
By viewing a map, the strategic importance of Eastern
Europe to the Soviet Union is readily apparent. Providing
both a buffer zone and a jumping-off position, East Europe
lies across the traditional invasion routes into Russia.
In his studies, Thomas Wolfe maintains that strategic access
and forward deployment of Soviet troops is a major factor
in Soviet WTO policy. Defensively, forward deployment
provides a buffer against both ground and air attacks. Any
invasion would be fought on German and Polish soil vice
Russian. Offensively, East Europe acts as a springboard for
Soviet troops. Ground and air forces, logistics and sup-
port facilities are in place forward deployed to launch an
invasion [Ref . 8] . A. Ross Johnson supports this conten-
tion maintaining that Soviet policy requires "a strong
military position east of the Elbe" with the primary Soviet
concern being the maintenance of a security buffer zone and,
secondarily, the deployment of offensive forces [Ref. 9] .
Within Eastern Europe, there is a differentiation of
the strategic importance between the Northern and Southern
tier states. The Northern Tier states of East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia are seen as of more importance
18

to Soviet defense than the southern states of Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania. A. Ross Johnson points to the gradual
bifurcation of the WTO into a northern and southern tier and
asserts that the northern states are the primary area of
concern with the southern states being secondary [Ref . 10]
.
Ivan Volgyes in his study points out that the North German
plain is far more suitable for Soviet armored operations than
the mountainous terrain of the Southern tier. He demon-
strates through force comparisons that the Soviet emphasis
is on the northern tier. As Table II shows, in aircraft,
tanks and personnel, the northern tier countries hold a
TABLE II
NON-SOVIET FORCE LEVELS; 19 81
T-54
Ground Air Naval Combat T-55
Forces Forces Forces Aircraft T-62 T-72
Northern 458 00 178,000 38,500 1,518 9,300 400tier
Southern 327, 000 89,800 20,500 708 4,350 160
tier '
Source: The Military Balance , 19 80-19 81 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1981) pp. 15-17.
military edge over the southern tier {Ref. 11] . Thomas Wolfe
adds that, in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the
internal production of light helicopters and jet trainers
further emphasizes the importance of the northern tier to
19

the Soviets. In Wolfe's view, the Soviets encouraged the
development of these industries in the two states and there-
fore demonstrated that they are set apart from the rest of
the WTO [Ref . 12]
.
Ann Cahn, in developing the eleven factors of supplier
influence maximization views holding a strategic position
as being beneficial to the recipient [Ref. 13] . If the
supplier needs the bases or strategic access then he is less
likely to terminate assistance and therefore the recipient
has increased latitude for bargaining. Though this may hold
in the Third World, the opposite is in effect in Eastern
Europe. The overbearing strategic importance of Eastern
Europe as a direct access route to the Soviet Union and the
proximity of Soviet military power means the Soviets will
be less likely to tolerate divergence. The Soviet Union
in Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968, has demonstrated
the capability and will power to use force to maintain her
strategic access. For Table I, strategic position was there-
fore seen to be in favor of the Soviet Union. The northern
tier states, due to their increased strategic position were
given a "++" value, while the southern tier states of
Bulgaria and Hungary were assigned a slightly less value of
"+." Since the only non-WTO state that it borders is Yugo-
slavia, Romania was assigned a neutral value.
C. RAW RESOURCES
As with strategic position, the function of raw resources
is usually to provide the recipient with a bargaining lever.
20

If the recipient controls scarce resources, then supply of
those resources may have an influencing effect upon the
Soviet Union. In reality, the circulation of scarce re-
sources within the Soviet Bloc flows from the Soviet Union
into Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union with its vast resource base in Siberia
is not dependent upon Eastern Europe for any scarce resource.
Eastern Europe though is becoming increasingly dependent
upon the Soviet Union for her energy needs. Ronald Oechsler
and John Martens show Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria and the GDR with below 50,0 00 barrels a day of
domestic oil production in 19 78. Romanian oil production
was up to 290,000 barrels a day but stagnating, and since
19 78, she has become a net importer of oil. In each of the
cases domestic consumption is rising, increased trade deficits
are developing with the OPEC nations, and the East Euro-
pean states are looking toward the Soviet Union to provide
more oil. While the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia import the vast majority of their oil from
the USSR, Romania's major supplier is OPEC iRef. 14J
.
East European states are looking towards nuclear power
to alleviate the energy problems of the future. Soviet de-
signed nuclear power stations are operating in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and, of course, the USSR [Ref.
15J . Lesley Fox reports that, in the case of Poland and
Hungary, construction of Soviet nuclear power stations are
21

in progress. Hungary planned to have its first reactor on
the line by 19 80 but lack of skilled workers and production
problems with the reactor vessels have delayed the activa-
tion of the plant. Poland, long dependent upon its re-
sources of coal and lignite, is just beginning to develop
nuclear power to offset growing energy problems. In 19 77
Poland contracted for Soviet equipment but current politi-
cal and economic problems have slowed the development of its
nuclear program. Romania is also moving into the nuclear
energy field but with Western technology not Soviet. The
Romanian nuclear power plant is being built by an association
of Canadian and Italian firms. There are some reports of
the Soviet Union also building a nuclear power plant in
Romania but the Romanian press has not commented on any
such plant [Ref . 16]
.
Through the use of joint investment programs, Eastern
Europe has been increasing its dependence on the Soviet
Union for raw resources. Table III is a breakdown of
principal joint projects in the 1976-1980 plan. The projects
require participating states to provide a percentage of the
development capital (in terms of equipment, labor or hard
capital) to exploit resource deposits. In return, each state
receives a portion of the developed resource for a given
period of time. In the case of the Orenburg project, the
return to Eastern Europe for development investment will be
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for twenty years [Ref
. 17] . in effect, the resource will
be paid for in advance by the European states with develop-
ment capital, but the Soviet Union will maintain control of
the resource since the majority of the joint projects are
inside her territory. The increasing trade deficits and
the cost of the joint projects will further limit options
for resource needs outside the Soviet Union. Romania's
reliance upon OPEC will increasingly come into question as
her economy falters
.
The prospect for nuclear power solv-
ing, or at least minimizing, energy problems will also have
a Soviet contingent. The Soviets supply the fisionable
material, technology, and the majority of the equipment for
the nuclear plants.
This paper does not intend to address the costs and
benefits of the Soviet-East European resource exchange.
The loss to the Soviet Union in opportunity costs by selling
resources to Eastern Europe below world market prices is an
issue that needs to be studied. Definitely the East Euro-
pean nations are gaining economically from the resource
trade but this paper is concerned with the political costs.
The joint investment projects lock the East European econo-
mies into the Soviet resource supply. As Table III shows,
Romania is the only country of the WTO that has consis-
tently steered clear of the projects. East Europe, with the
exception of Romania, is dependent upon the Soviet Union
for oil imports. The total reliance of the WTO members,
24

outside of Romania, on Soviet resource development means
Eastern Europe is dependent upon theSoviet Union in this
area. Therefore on Table I, the resource factor was seen as
being highly in favor of the Soviet Union. Romania was given
a neutral value since, at least for the present, it is not
dependent upon Soviet resources.
D. PARIAH STATE
The pariah syndrome refers to a situation where a reci-
pient is locked into a supplier due to the recipient being
an outcast of the international arena. If the pariah
recipient cannot produce its own arms then it is dependent
upon the one supplier (if any) that is willing to incur
negative international feeling to supply arms. In the case
of Eastern Europe, none of the nations fit this category.
Though Eastern Europe may be locked into Soviet armaments for
financial or ideological reasons, the pariah syndrome is not
a factor.
E. PRESTIGE
The prestige factor of arms sales has two components.
First, the prestige acquired through receiving arms from a
particular supplier. The supplier's armaments have a repu-
tation for being the best which then reflects upon the mili-
tary power of the recipient. Second, the sale of a particular
weapon system can indicate a recipient pecking order. The
ability of a recipient to acquire advanced armaments before
25

others within the region from the same supplier gives the
initial recipient the prestige of being the "chosen one."
Within Eastern Europe, the prestige of owning Soviet
arms in general is not a factor. The perceived performance
of Soviet arms in the Middle East conflicts, regardless of
the justness of the perception, has cast doubts on the quality
of Soviet weapons. A. Ross Johnson in his study on the
northern tier discussed Polish dissatisfaction with Soviet
arms transfer policies. He states that after the Arab
defeat in the 19 67 war there was admiration of Israeli
equipment and tactics, and disparagement of Soviet equip-
ment and tactics [Ref . 18] . The Wall Street Journal points
to Soviet explanations after the defeat of Soviet arms in
the 19 82 Lebanon invasion by the Israeli's and states:
The real point is that the Soviet complaint was
spoken like the arms merchant that Moscow has become,
Soviet sensitivity on the subject betrays its fear
that the reputation of its arms has suffered such a
grievous blow that it would dry up one of Russia's
main sources of foreign exchange earnings. {Ref. 19
J
Internationally, the repeated failures of Soviet arms in
the Middle East has cast some doubt on the quality of
Soviet weapons. This doubt, regardless of how realistic,
negates any prestige factor in owning Soviet weapons.
Table IV is a chart of Soviet major equipment trans-
fers into Eastern Europe during the 1970s. Though there is
a difference in equipment transfers between the Northern
and Southern tier, the equipment that was transferred seems




SOVIET MAJOR EQUIPMENT TRANSFER TO EASTERN
EUROPE : 19 69--1982
T-62 T-72 SU-20 Mig-23 ZSU-23-4
GDR 1969 1 1978 1974 19 79 1975
Poland 1969 1 1978 1974 1975
Czechoslovakia 1969 1 1978 1974 1978 1975
Hungary 1969 1 19 7 8 1980 1
Bulgaria 1969 1 1978 1978 1975
Romania 1969 1978 1981 2 1975
— all dates suspected contract dates except where
indicated.
Suspected delivery date
Listed in 19 81-19 82 Military Balance
Sources: Compilation of the following sources:
1. Military Balance
,
years 19 71 to 1982;




World Armaments and Disarmaments Yearbook
,
years 19 70 to 19 82; Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute.
3. Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft ; years
1970-19 82. Jane's Publishing Company,
London.
4. Jane's Armour and Artillery, 19 82-19 83 ,
Jane's Publishing Compnay, London, 19 82.
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the case of the T-62 and T-72 tanks, the WTO members received
each tank series within the same years. With the exception
of Hungary, the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun
was contracted for uniformly by the WTO in 19 75. The SU-20
was not received by the southern tier but was contracted for
by all three northern tier states in 1974. The Mig-23 was
sent to each member except Poland, the contracts for the
other five members were probably issued between 19 78 and
19 79. The chart does not indicate in any of the cases that
a state has consistently been favored by early or unique




Inventory capability refers to the ability of a reci-
pient to store enough equipment and supplies to carry out
military operations without being dependent upon resupply
from the supplier state. If a state is dependent upon re-
supply then military operations will be contingent on the
desires of the supplier. The classic example of influence
through lack of inventory being the U.S.' withholding of
equipment from Israel in the Arab-Israeli 19 73 war to save
the Egyptian 3rd. Army.
Little is known of the logistics or inventory capability




Some pact nations may also suffer from shortages,
but the fact that their equipment is standardized
would enable them to restock more quickly. The
Soviet logistic system, which uses a mix of rail,
road and pipeline, has been greatly improved in
recent years. [Ref. 20]
This indicates that the WTO members may be fairly dependent
upon the Soviet logistic system. Logically, since the
Soviet Union supplies the majority of the oil (with the
exception of Romania) and military equipment, the capa-
bility of WTO members to fight without Soviet support would
be limited. Therefore inventory capability was seen as
favoring the USSR.
G. ADVISORY PERSONNEL
There are two aspects to advisory personnel. First,
the need of the recipient to have access to advisory per-
sonnel to train her military in the use, both technical and
tactical, of the new equipment. If a state cannot mili-
tarily function effectively without advisory personnel, then
successful military operations are dependent upon the sup-
port of the supplier state. Second is the question of
overall training and doctrine. What effect does the cul-
tural and military doctrinal education programs given in the
supplier country have on the recipients military elite?
The recipient military elite may become closer affiliated to
the supplier's culture and values than to their own.
The first aspect, in-country advisors, is seen as having
no influential effect. All of the WTO member states have
29

been operating Soviet equipment for decades and need little
outside instruction. Many of the members have provided
instructor personnel on Soviet equipment to third parties.
The loss of Soviet advisors would not impair the combat
effectiveness of the WTO members.
The second aspect, long-term effects of exchange pro-
grams, is much more difficult to quantify. A. Ross Johnson,
Robert Dean, and Alexander Alexiev indicate that the train-
ing of WTO military elites within the Soviet Union may have
more effect than initially believed. Concerning Poland,
prior to the establishment of the current military govern-
ment, they contend that though the Polish military retains
its ethos as guardian of Polish national interest, it also
is closely linked to the professional Soviet military and
takes seriously its responsibilities in the WTO. They also
maintain that the GDR military, lacking legitimacy, has even
closer relations to the Soviet military than Poland.
Ideology and defense of the socialist commonwealth provides
a rationale for the separation of Germany and the existence
of the GDR military {Ref . 21J
.
This falls short though of demonstrating that the mili-
tary elites feel more affiliated with their Soviet counter-
parts than their national governments. Reports of
dissatisfaction with Soviet support and the arrogance of
Soviet troops within WTO territory would seem to dampen
the Soviet-East European military relationship. While the
educational exchanges may function to lessen anti-Soviet
30

feelings and help integrate the East European military
elites into the coalition doctrine, it does not replace the
traditional national tendencies of the military. The mili-
tary is in a position of not working against Soviet hegemony,
but, not really working in favor of Soviet control either.
This may be argued against in the case of the military
takeover in Poland, but certain points need to be remembered
in the Polish case. First, the professional military has
not been used in quelling disturbances. Elite political
para-military forces have been used in all civilian related
operations. Second, after the collapse of the Party, the
establishment of military rule stabilizing the internal
situation probably forestalled a Soviet invasion. Though the
military is carrying out many of the policies the Soviets
desire, they still have some latitude that would not exist
if the Soviets invaded. The military takeover in Poland
helped to forestall total Soviet control and save Poland
from the experience of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Overall, the WTO members were given a neutral value
concerning the advisory factor. In-country advisors were
not needed to operate equipment, and educational/cultural
exchanges among the military elite has not supplemented
Soviet ideals for nationalistic feelings.
H. ALTERNATE SOURCES
As Table V demonstrates, there are few suppliers outside
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Source: SIPRI Yearbooks 1971-1982
Notes: The 1977 SIPRI Yearbook shows Czechoslovakia trans-
ferring BMP-76s, T62s, and ZSU-23-4s to Poland and Bulgaria.
Prior listings show said equipment being transferred from
the Soviet Union. Since the 1977 listing was not repeated in
any other yearbook, or in any other recipient case, the report
is believed to be in error and was excluded from Table V.
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(excluding the Soviet Union) supplying Bulgaria, the GDR,
Hungary and Poland is Czechoslovakia. The items supplied
are primarily support equipment with limited military use.
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia have licensed production of
some Soviet armoured equipment, this equipment is probably
being transferred within the Soviet Bloc but is riot listed
due to tracing problems. Romania has imported equipment from
Czechoslovakia, UK, France, and China. Though Romania is
going outside the WTO for equipment, the items are limited
in number and primarily support in nature. The 19 82-19 83
Military Balance shows the Romanian military as being armed
predominantly with Soviet equipment [Ref. 22]. Since Romania
at least demonstrated a connection with outside suppliers,
she was given a "+" value on Table I while the rest of the
WTO was given a "++" value.
I. FINANCIAL ABILITIES
The ability of Eastern Europe to attract alternate
sources is severely limited by their constrained financial
capabilities. The growing hard currency debt requires Eastern
Europe to restrict the flow of Western imports. Table VI
is an estimate of Eastern Europe's hard currency debt. Joan
Zoeter demonstrates that in response to the rising debt,
Eastern Europe has been attempting to increase exports to
non-communist countries while restricting non-communist
imports. Zoeter states though:
The East Europeans will, however, be hard pressed to




EASTERN EUROPE: ESTIMATED NET HARD
CURRENCY DEBT TO THE WEST
(In millions U.S. dollars, 1979)
1971 1976 1979
Bulgaria 723 2,756 3,730
Czechoslovak ia 160 1,434 3,070
GDR 1,205 5,047 8,440
Hungary 84 8 2,852 7,320
Poland 764 10,680 20,000
Romania 1,227 2,528 6,700
Source: Joan Parport Zoeter, "Easter n Europe:
Hard Currency Debt," Joint Economic
Commission, East European Economic
Assessment, Part 2, 19 81 . Derived from
Chart, p. 720.
Because deliveries of Soviet energy are expected to
level off and Soviet exports of other industrial
materials at best will grow slowly, Eastern Europe
will require increasing amounts of Western oil and
other materials... The outlook for increasing
exports is dim as Western demand will remain
sluggish and protectionism strong. [Ref. 23J
With the hard currency debt problem, the economies of
Eastern Europe cannot afford to import Western arms. The
arms would only exascerbate the hard currency debt problem
without providing any increased production capability as a
return on the investment.
Since the East European countries are restricted finan-
cially from purchasing non-communist arms then they are
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economically dependent upon the Soviet Union as their major
supplier. The question of who shoulders the financial burden
of arms in Eastern Europe will be discussed in Chapter III.
The primary point for this section is that Eastern Europe
cannot attract alternate sources for arms with economic
compensation. In Table I, Eastern Europe was shown to be
highly dependent upon the USSR for the financial capability
factor.
J . THREAT
Threat evaluation relates to the recipients need for
arms. If a recipient is involved in a hot war, his need
for arms and therefore dependence on his supplier is greater
than if he was at peace. Threat evaluation within Eastern
Europe is complicated by the political intricacies of com-
munist control. The actors are not clearly differentiated,
whose security is in question, the communist party, the
nation, or the collective region? Who is threatening the
security, Soviet hegemony, Western counter-revolution, or
European revanchism? Though these are important questions,
the scope of this study necessitates a narrower field of
view. Therefore, the study of the threat focused on the
security objectives of the WTO states relative to the
governments in power.
The obvious threat to the Warsaw Pact nations is from
NATO, but do the individual members actually consider an
overt invasion by NATO as a coalition realistic? Peter Bender
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maintains that the WTO members do not believe there is a
high probability of NATO invasion but do have security con-
cerns. In Bender's view, the GDR's primary security concern
is fear of consolidation with the FRG. As the FRG gains in
power in the West, she may be able to isolate the GDR from
Russian protection and unify Germany. Therefore, in Bender's
view, GDR policies are based on reinforcing the ties between
herself and the Soviet Union while attempting to legitimize
her existence as an independent state [Ref . 24] . Robert
Dean supports Bender's view stating:
In the event of a central war, it must be a fundamental
strategic objective of the East German Communist
leadership to preclude any chance for a separate
peace between the USSR and the Western Powers at the
expense of the GDR, or any chance that the course of
the war could undermine or weaken the Soviet political
commitment to the East German states. The NPA's
integration into the Warsaw Pact and in particular its
interdependent relationship with the GSFG therefore
serve a very basic purpose for the GDR leadership.
[Ref. 25]
Dean goes on to show that the GDR leadership feels that the
political risk of a war limited to East Germany is so great,
that they stress that the WTO must retain military superi-
ority to deter Western aggression [Ref. 26J
.
The East German leadership still fears West Germany and
for this reason has always supported a strong defensive
posture. In 19 79 Erich Honecker in response to the pro-
posed deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in
Europe, "likened the West Germans and other NATO members to
Hitler and Goebels and said the East Germans and Russians
were strengthening the defense capabilities of our countries
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to stop the aggressiveness of West German imperialism"
[Ref
.
27] . The statement is aimed directly at the FRG vice
a general condemnation of NATO. The East Germans have
always supported a strong WTO and have backed the Soviet
Union in the call for increased defense spending among the
WTO members. As an influence factor on Table I, the GDR
threat value was rated highly in favor of the USSR.
The threat level in Poland and Czechoslovakia is lower
than the GDR and based more on ideological feelings rather
than reasonable national security imperatives. A. Ross
Johnson demonstrates that the heart of Polish military doc-
trine rests on the "Proposition that national defense is
illusory for a small communist state and that only the
Soviet military coalition—the Warsaw Pact—can provide
military security" [Ref. 2 8] . Commensurate with the belief
in the WTO, Polish doctrine rests on two assumptions.
First, if a general war starts it will escalate, as a second
echelon area Poland will be hit by NATO nuclear weapons.
Second, the Warsaw Pack must maintain military superiority
to ensure "that a war will not be fought on Pact territory"
[Ref. 29]
.
Current Czechoslovakian doctrine like Poland rests on
the Socialist coalition concept. The restructuring of the
Czechoslovakian military after the 19 68 intervention by
the Soviet Union removed any thoughts of military doctrines
based on national imperatives. Alexander Alexiev states:
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This principle (collective defense of the socialist
community) explicitly predetermines Czechoslovakia's
alliance with the Soviet Union and membership in the
Warsaw Pact. According to it, the international
character of socialist defense implies international
obligations on the part of all the socialist coun-
tries. The Czechoslovak defense system is an
organic part of the Warsaw Pact defense system. [Ref . 30]
The threat is the struggle against capitalist forces and
Czechoslovakia as a member of the socialist coalition must
do her part to defend the socialist commonwealth.
In both the Polish and Czechoslovakian cases, their
position as the main battleground raises the threat level.
If war should break out between the Soviet Union and NATO,
Poland and Czechoslovakia will either lay across NATO
invasion routes or Soviet logistics lines. Coupled with
this, the communist regimes of Poland and Czechoslovakia
could not hope to maintain power without Soviet support.
The military power of the Bloc both deters external inter-
vention which might lead to a general war and prevents
counter-revolutionary elements from replacing the current
regimes. In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, threat
evaluation was given a "+" value.
The primary difference between the threat level for
Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria and Romania is the
importance of the Norther tier over the Southern tier.
Hungary has no strong NATO countries adjacent and though
Bulgaria borders Greece and Turkey the geography is not
conducive to large scale military operations. Therefore,
the threat was given a neutral value in both cases.
38

Romania is the one real outlier in the group since her
defense posture is based upon national imperatives and not
defense of the socialist commonwealth. Causescu defines
Romanian defense interests in these terms:
Given the country's geographic position, the equipment
and training of the army should be based on the con-
cept of defensive war.... As you see, I do not speak
of strategic objectives, since we do not intend to go
outside our frontiers.... We have no other strategy
than to make sure that Romanian land does not fall
prey to imperialist aggression, to a policy of
strength. [Ref. 31]
The doctrine is one of partisan warfare where a large per-
centage of the population could be quickly mobilized in
defense of the country. Alex Alexiev maintains Romania
makes little attempt disguising the identity of the proba-
ble aggressor. Quoting Romanian sources Alexiev describes
the aggressor in the following terms:
possess gigantic military forces and technological
superiority, as well as nuclear weapons, which
however, he will not use because of the negative
propaganda effect and because he will expect to ac-
complish his objectives by conventional means. The
type of war the Romanians anticipate is a blitzkrieg
involving airborne assaults and rapid penetration by
armored troops from several directions. The aggres-
sor's war objective is seen, in an apparent allusion
to the Czech precedent, as quickly seizing the major
political centers of the country, installing a puppet
regime, and presenting the world with a fait accompli .
Throughout the aggression, the enemy, whose war moti-
vation is said to be strictly political, will also
engage in a cunning propaganda compaign in an attempt
to mislead world opinion and sow ideological confu-
sion among the defenders of the country. [Ref. 32J
Clearly the probable aggressor is the Soviet Union and,
being unable to match Soviet military power, Romania has
developed a partisan warfare approach to defend her
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national security. A partisan warfare doctrine is seen pri-
marily as a deterrent. As Jiri Valenta points out, the
ability to mount national resistance raises the cost of
intervention to the Soviet Union. The decision by the
Soviets to intervene militarily may be withheld while other
options are explored [Ref . 33] . Romania does perceive a
threat but since the threat is the Soviet Union, the threat
factor in Table I is valued in favor of the recipient.
K. INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION
Cooperation in the military-technical sphere has assumed
a large role in the system of internal cooperation among
the fraternal armies. Thanks to this, national troop
contingents are today equipped mainly with unified mod-
ern models of arms and combat materiel. Apart from the
Soviet Union, new models of combat materiel are also
being produced, with regard to its standardization and
unification, by industry in a number of other socialist
countries. The Polish defense industry, created with
great assistance from the USSR is also working effici-
ently within the framework of the socialist division
of labor. [Ref. 34J
This statement by Polish General Antos illustrates the
communist line on the collective nature of the WTO. The
socialist division of labor efficiently operating in the
defense field with each WTO member helping to provide
standardized arms for the fraternal armies. Socialist
internationalism overcoming nationalist tendencies and
allowing cooperation among the fraternal countries . There
is an underlying current within the statement pointing to
national troop contingents and arms industry in other
socialist countries as a sign of independence. The implica-
tion being that each country has national defense means, and
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the sovereignty that entails, they then voluntarily partici-
pate in the coalition. Since each member contributes to the
coalition's defense, each member is an equal partner in the
socialist commonwealth.
The standardization of arms in the Warsaw Pact and the
fact that these arms are predominantly Soviet is clear.
The review of any Military Balance shows the vast majority
of WTO line items are Soviet designed. What is not clear
is the extent of the military industries and their contri-
bution within the socialist division of labor. Daniel Papp
argues that, though Poland and Czechoslovakia supply some
of their own military equipment, and Romania is collaborating
with Yugoslavia to produce military aircraft, these efforts
are dwarfed by the size of Soviet military assistance to the
WTO [Ref . 35] . Michael Checinski on the other hand argues
that Poland's military industrial complex is a primary con-
tributor to her current economic problems. Checinski main-
tains that the Soviets use Eastern Europe (primarily Poland
and Czechoslovakia) as a parts manufacturer for older equip-
ment. He notes that the Soviets only pass the license to
Eastern Europe after Soviet manufacturers have begun production
on the next generation. Checinski shows Polish production of
the T-54/55 tank was begun as the Soviets moved to the T-62/
T-72 tank and T-72 tank production was initiated in Poland
as the Soviets began tooling up for the T-80. In Checinski 's
view the Soviets are just insuring a production capability
exists to service their older generation equipment. Secondly,
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Checinski argues that rather than specialization, the Soviets
inspire competition between the two major non-Soviet WTO
arms producers. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia produce
jet trainers, jet strike trainers, armored personnel car-
riers, and main battle tanks. Neither of the two countries
produce modernized arms that can compete with the Soviet
arms industry [Ref . 36]
.
Table VII is a breakout of indigenous and licensed pro-
duction by WTO members. The table can be broken down into
three categories:
1. Non-producers: Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary
2. Minor producers: Romania
3. Major producers (relative to the other non-Soviet
WTO members) : Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The non-producers have no real indigenous production
capability and therefore are highly dependent upon the USSR
for equipment. In the case of the GDR, the majority of
Germany's military-industrial capability is located in
areas controlled by the FRG. Though Germany is highly
active with the Soviet Union in the fields of research and
development, and coastal ship production, she does not pro-
duce any other major weapons systems. Bulgaria by all
indications is limited to small arms production. Hungary,
though it had a developing aircraft industry prior to World
War II, now only produces scout cars and small arms. Jane '
s
All the World's Aircraft 1964-19 65 , states that German
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removed the industries. After the war, the WTO hindered
any resurgence of Hungarian aircraft industry [Ref . 37]
.
Romania is in its own special category for two primary
reasons. First, Romanian production capabilities are
limited but growing, and second, it is the only WTO member
to develop military licensed production connections outside
the bloc. Alex Alexiev states that Romania is attempting
to develop an arms production capability to gain a degree
of self-reliance and move away from Soviet arms dependence.
Alexis notes Romania is following a two track system in her
arms development. The first track involves indigenous pro-
duction of low technology weapons and, according to Alexis,
the Romanians have been fairly successful. The second track
involves gaining high technology experience through the use
of license production. The license production of French
helicopters and the joint ORAO fighter project with Yugo-
slavia demonstrates some successes [Ref. 38] . The Romanians
have also demonstrated the capability of modifying and up-
grading old Soviet equipment. In 19 78 the Romanians intro-
duced the M-77, a modified T-55 medium tank [Ref. 39 J
.
The Romanians are developing their armaments industry and
the success in the low technology area is directly bene-
ficial to their partisan warfare doctrine but they are
still dependent on imports for a considerable share of their
equipment and sub-components. The indigenous production
capability was not determined to be self-sufficient enough
to rate it any higher than a "+" on Table I.
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Disregarding the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia
are the primary weapons producers in the WTO. Viewing
Table VII, the similarities in production discussed by
Checenski are apparent. The Czech L-29, L-39, and L-39Z
series of aircraft are comparable to the Polish TS-11, iskra
100 and iskra 200 series. The Czech L-29 was the standar-
dized jet trainer within the WTO. In 19 72 the WTO standardized
jet trainer to replace the L-29 was chosen; the Czech L-39
[Ref. 40]. The Polish TS-11 series was developed in the
same time frame and one can suppose that it was after the
same market as the L-39. In fact, Czechoslovakia had a
contract to supply 100 L-39s and 20 L-29s to India. The
contract was switched in 19 75 to Poland and fulfilled with
the TS-11 series [Ref. 41J . The contract switch may have
been a means of placating Poland for not receiving the WTO
contract, or Czechoslovakia may have had problems fulfilling
both contracts simultaneously and the smaller contract was
then given to the Polish manufacturers. Either way it
demonstrates that the two aircraft series are fairly com-
parable. One side note on the awarding of the WTO contract,
the Polish trainer is powered by a Polish manufactured
engine, the L-39 has a Soviet built engine IRef . 42]
.
In other areas of production shown in Table VII Polish
and Czech military armaments are similar. Co-production or
licensed production run concurrently on the OT-62, T-62, and
T-72. Poland outproduces Czechoslovakia in small naval craft
but considering Czechoslovakia is landlocked that production
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edge is understandable. The AN-2 and Mi-2 are vintage early
196 0s utility aircraft and have limited military value. The
AN-2 8 is vintage 19 69 and is just a two-engine propellor
driven plane and, like the AN-2, is only a utility aircraft.
Outside naval production, the Mi-2, AN-2 and AN-28, the
Polish and Czechoslovakian armaments industries are fairly
redundant.
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia were rated "+" in Table I
for indigenous production. The rating was given more for
reasons of capability than actual production. License pro-
duction of actual combat aircraft (part of MiG series) was
stopped in Poland in 19 59 and in Czechoslovakia in the 19 6 0s.
Both countries have demonstrated that their aircraft indus-
try is capable of producing modern combat aircraft (even
if just licensed production of Soviet aircraft! yet do not,
they rely on the Soviet- Union for all modern combat aircraft.
In other equipment areas the story is basically the same,
reliance on the Soviet union to supply the modern arms while
indigenous production provides for internal needs of second
rate equipment.
L. IDEOLOGY
Vernon Aspaturian states Soviet ideology functions "as
a system of knowledge and as an analytical prism, it reflects
an image of the existing social order and the distinctive
analytical instruments (dialectical laws, and categories
like the class struggle, historical stages, and so on) for
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its diagnosis and prognosis" [Ref. 43]. Ideology is not
the driving force of Soviet decision making, but it is the
window through which they view the world to make decisions.
If the recipient defines its interests in terms of the
suppliers interests then there must be a shared value system
or ideology between the two. John C. Campbell, not an advo-
cate of ideology being a Soviet imperative, stated that the
lesson the Soviets learned over their expulsion from Egypt
was the importance of ideology. A supplier/recipient
relationship that is based solely on a quid pro quo is tem-
porary in nature. Ideology provides permanence to the rela-
tionship with shared values and added influence through
interparty associations [Ref. 44] . The purpose of this thesis
is not to get bogged down in the intricacies of communist
ideology but to study the arms transfer relationship of which
ideology is a component. Therefore, the values assigned to
Table I were reached by a simple formula. All the states in
question are socialist and, as such, share a common ideology
with the Soviet Union. Within the ideological framework,
Romania demonstrates a significant deviation by openly main-
taining national policies and objectives over socialist
internationalism ideals. Therefore in the case of Romania,
ideology was rated as slightly less in favor of the USSR
relative to the rest of the WTO.
M. ANALYSIS
Reviewing Table I, a hierarchy theoretically can be
established for the WTO member states. The GDR should be
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the most dependent state and therefore the most influenced
by the Soviet Union. The key elements are the strategic
location, threat, ideology and lack of a military capability
independent of Moscow (combination of elements of inventory
capability, alternate sources, and indigenous production)
.
The second tier consists of Czechoslovakia and Poland, both
with a lower threat evaluation and a slightly higher inde-
pendent military capability than the GDR. The third tier
consists of Bulgaria and Hungary, the primary difference
being strategic location. In reality the differences be-
tween the first three tiers are minimal and consequently
any differentiation in influence patterns probably does not
exist—or is at least too subtle to detect. The separation
between the first three tiers as a block and the fourth
tier, Romania, is much greater. The primary elements dif-
ferentiating Romania from the rest of the WTO lie in the
combination of strategic location, threat evaluation,
ideology and independent military capability.
The inter-relationship between strategic location,
threat evaluation, ideology and military capability makes it
difficult to analytically separate the impact of the indi-
vidual factors. The decreased value of the strategic loca-
tion, relative to the other WTO members, allowed Romania a
little greater latitude with the Soviet Union. Ceausescu
could be a little less ideologically doctrinaire and begin
to develop an independent military capability as long as he
did not become a threat to the Soviet Union or attempt to
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pull out of the WTO. The redefining of ideology with a
national component and the establishment of a partisan warfare
doctrine based on a nationalistic threat evaluation then
increased Romania's political latitude. The cost of any-
Soviet intervention had been increased. This is not to say
that the Soviet Union would never invade Romania; but that
the cost versus gains ratio has raised the threshold and
allowed limited Romanian defiance of Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe.
The importance of independent military capabilities for
Romanian deviation is underscored by Alex Alexiev in his
study on Party-Military relations in Romania [Ref . 4 5]
.
Alexiev contends that Soviet political hegemony in East
Europe produced important consequences for the national
military establishments. First, by subordinating national
security interests to collective defense of the socialist
commonwealth, East European military establishments were
denied their primary function for defense of the nation
state. Second, since the Soviet Army was the primary
arbiter of power, the East European military establishments
held little political clout. The local parties maintained
power through Soviet support vice developing a reliance on
a national military. Third, the divergent interests of
national and ideological imperatives worked to maintain
the split between the local parties and the local military.




Military Desiderata Party Desiderata
1. nationalist values - universalist values
2. loyalty to national - loyalty to external
political factor political factor
3. national military - supranational military
prerogative prerogative
4. national military - supranational military
autonomy integration
5. high domestic - low domestic political
political input input
[Ref. 46]
The desiderata for the Party and military are conflic-
tual in nature. The party maintains power and the dominance
of its desiderata through reliance on an external factor;
the Soviet Union. In the case of Romania, Ceausescu rede-
fined the parties desiderata more in line with national
interests and consequently the military desiderata. The
increased accommodation between the party and military de-
creased the political dependence upon the Soviet Union and
allowed for greater Romanian deviation.
The degree of Romanian independence relative to the rest
of the WTO as per Table I can be demonstrated in a review
of statements on two separate Foreign Policy issues; the
deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe,
and the shooting down of KAL flight 007. In both the dis-
armament talks and the KAL incident all WTO members, with
the exception of Romania, supported the USSR.
1. Missile Deployment; Bulgaria
The world is a witness to the fact that all substantial
proposals on strengthening peace, peaceful coexistence,
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and detente have been made so far by the Soviet Union
and the rest of the countries of the socialist community.
Radically different is the approach of the imperialist
countries. Under the dictate of the U.S. Administration,
in the past several years the West has undertaken another
step toward the road of confrontation and preparation of
war. New systems of weapons have been created—neturon,
binary, laser, and space. The old systems—nuclear
missiles stationed on land, under sea, and in the air,
and those with strategic or intermediate range as well
as new types of planes, tanks, and other weapons—are
being modernized.
The Reagan administration's decision to deploy the
latest intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the
territories of certain West European countries up to
the end of 19 83 is particularly dangerous for the cause
of peace. These missiles are capable of striking targets
deep in the territory of the Soviet Union in only a few
minutes, not taking into consideration the territories
of the European socialist countries, including Bulgaria.
If this decision is realized, the balance of power
existing now in Europe will thus be violated.
You, yourself, understand, comrades, that the Soviet
Union and all the socialist countries cannot be indif-
ferent in the face of nuclear death standing on the
threshold of our own home. That is why the Soviet
Government has so categorically stated that, in co-
ordination with its allies, it will undertake appro-
priate measures which will also create, on the
territories of the United States and of the countries
where the U.S. missiles will be deployed, the same mili-
tary threat which the United States is trying to create
against the Soviet Union and its allies. All Warsaw
Pact member-countries, are backing this stand of the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 4 7]
2. Missile Deployment; The GDR
The Soviet Union has once again offered a far-
reaching variant: to forego the deployment of all new
medium-range missiles in Europe and to reduce to about
one-third the already existing ones, approximately 30
units on each side. To Western charges that within the
framework of these 300 units the USSR could have more
missiles than NATO, the Soviet Union stated its willing-
ness to keep only as many medium-range missiles as Great
Britain and France, in which case both sides would also
have the same number of medium-range nuclear-arms-
carrying aircraft. When it was suggested that the
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USSR would with the identical number of missiles have
more warheads on their SS-20 missiles, it declared her
willingness to negotiate about an identical number of
carriers—missiles and aircraft—as well as of warheads.
Honesty, consistency, and flexibility characterized
the attitude of the Soviet Union and the socialist
community. Its position is based on the only possible
principle: equality and equal security. If the United
States and its NATO allies were prepared to negotiate
on the same basis, then things would run differently in
Geneva, then it would not take long to achieve agreement
there. Instead, the United States resorts to evasion
and equivocation to block the negotiations, to deploy
new missiles at any price and thus gain military supe-
riority over the socialist states. In his interview
for PRAVDA Yuriy Andropov once again made impressively
plain: The Soviet Union's flexibility has its limits.
It and its allies will have to take corresponding counter-
measures to preserve the balance of power at the regional,
European, and global level, should the United States'
position at the negotiations continue to remain destruc-
tive and biased, and the deployment of American Pershing
and cruise missiles in Europe come about. [Ref . 48]
3. Missile Deployment: Hungary
Of the 'zero option' proposed by the U.S. he said:
'From what we know of this recommendation we conclude
that the U.S. seeks unilateral advantages. She would
like the Soviet Union to destroy her missiles, yet the
U.S. is silent over France's and Britain's nuclear arms
and apparently rules out the destruction of her own
forward-based nuclear devices. The Warsaw Treaty states'
response to this sham 'zero option' is a genuine 'zero
option 1 : the discussants should consider Europe's all
mid-range nuclear devices, including the land and sea-
based missiles and nuclear arms carrying aircraft.
'
Evaluating Leonid Brezhnev's Bonn moratorium propo-
sals, he said: 'Observance of the moratorium would
improve the Geneva talks' climate and would help reach
the lower level of armament on which the Soviet Union
and the U.S. could agree in the Geneva talks.' He re-
called the foreign ministers' latest stance on ulti-
mately turning Europe entirely nuclear-free. 'That
would be the real and sought-for 'zero option' for the
European peoples. [Ref. 49]
4. Missile Deployment: Czechoslovakia
As regards the undoubtedly most burning problem of
our epoch—halting the arms race, and disarmament—the
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session of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
unanimously pointed to the greatest present threat:
the NATO decision to produce neutron weapons, and the
new plan for extensive strategic armament.
In this connection, we welcomed the new significant
disarmament proposals the USSR put forward by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev at the Soviet-West German talks last
week. We expressed great appreciation for this Soviet
program aimed at limiting nuclear arms in Europe to the
lowest possible level. We fully endorsed this program
and noted that it is essential to literally unblock all
disarmament talks that are now obstrcuted, and to do
everything for them to become productive at all levels
—
starting with the SALT talks and the Vienna talks on
reducing armed forces and armament in central Europe,
down to the Geneva disarmament talks—and to show an
upward tendency. We also paid great attention to ques-
tions connected with the preparation of the second special
UN General Assembly session on disarmament, which is to
be held next June
.
Even the alleged peace project put forward by
American President Reagan, which is to serve as a U.S.
platform during the talks, by its onesidedness and clear
unacceptability to the Soviet Union, does not arouse
any credibility. That zero option is to be a zero one
only as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not to
mention the fact that recent history has provided telling
evidence of the American attitude to treaties. It was
the American congress which, as is well known, failed
to ratify the already signed SALT II treaty. [Ref . 50
J
5 . Missile Deployment; Poland
The Soviet-American negotiations on intermediate-
range missiles were started on Moscow's initiative in
November 19 81. Washington did not want these negotia-
tions. It was set on deploying new missiles in accord-
ance with the NATO December 19 79 resolution to be able
to conduct talks later from a position of strength and
military superiority. As a result of pressure and demands
voiced by a range of WEst European governments, the nego-
tiations commenced earlier. Nevertheless, Washington
applied blocking tactics. It presented the unfeasible
concept of a so-called 'zero option,' and then the
concept of a 'temporary solution,' aimed at the same
thing, in other words, a unilateral missile disarma-
ment by the USSR. [Ref. 51J
In all five cases the USSR policies are for peace,
the U.S. deployment of missiles is a drive for military
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superiority. The USSR has demonstrated increased flexibility
in the disarmament talks while NATO and the U.S. has been
intransigent. The Soviet disarmament proposals are dis-
cussed as significant and far-reaching while the U.S.
proposal is described as a sham and one-sided. Contrast this
against Romanian releases:
6 . Missile Deployment: Romania
The attainment of a balance between East and West
should be done not by introducing new nuclear missiles
and armaments but by substantially reducing existing
ones. We believe that after such an agreement and cut-
backs are attained, one should continue to act to com-
pletely eliminate medium-range and tactical missiles
and all kinds of nuclear weapons in Europe in order to
create a Europe free of any kind of nuclear armaments.
[Ref. 52]
The new peace action of Socialist Romania's presi-
dent starts from the promise that, although the Soviet-
American negotiations in Geneva have not made progress,
there is still enough time for these negotiations to
end successfully until the end of the year, and no
effort should be spared to reach an agreement on the
non-emplacement of further missiles, the withdrawal
and destruction of those in place, which would naturally
meet the interests and aspirations of all peoples, the
Soviet and American peoples included, the general in-
terests of peace and security, bearing positively on the
world political climate as a whole.
Romania suggests that, in case that an understanding
on this question is not possible, then, at least, the
nonemplacement of medium-range missiles in the terri-
tories of West Germany, of GDR, of Czechoslovakia and
other states should be taken into consideration, as an
-intermediary measure until a final agreement is reached
within the Soviet-American negotiations. [Ref. 53J
The primary objective is the removal or cutback of
nuclear weapons within Europe. Rhetoric on the peaceful
intentions of the USSR, or U.S., is excluded. Both super-
powers are viewed in their role as nuclear actors of
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sustaining the arms race, there are none of the accusations
of a U.S. drive for military superiority made by the rest of
the WTO members. Romanian security concerns and policy lie
in the removal of all nuclear weapons regardless of the
owner.
7. KAL 07 Incident: Bulgaria
The fact is not denied, says the Bulgarian jurist,
that having substantially diverted from the inter-
national route, the airliner has flown for two hours
over the territory of the Soviet Union. The actions
of Soviet intercepters, undertaken in response to the
violation, are in complete compliance with the norms
of international law, which defends state sovereignty
over air space. The airliner which has infringed the
air space of the USSR, has been ordered through the
well known signals to land. Its suspicious conduct
however, is in contrast with all international regula-
tions for flight—flying without aeronavigational lights,
refusal to react to the Soviet air controllers and dis-
obeying the signals for langing—these in themselves are
sufficient to trigger warning shots. [Ref . 54]
Therefore, without being choosy about its means,
the White House purposefully organizes 'mistakes,' or
directs terrorist actions, which serve the purpose of
kindling the anti-Soviet hysteria. Special antihuman
skill is needed in order to sow hatred. The South
Korean airplane case proves that Washington has turned
this sinister skill into a basic part of its state
policy. In his well-known Hollywood style the Presi-
dent shed crocodile tears for the tragedy that had been
planned by his special services. Afterwards, posing
as a judge, he started dispensing judgement in the form
of some sanctions against the USSR, aimed first of all
towards increasing even further the differences in bi-
lateral relations. On the one hand he demonstrated
compassion, aimed at convincing the U.S. allies and
the world public opinion of the nonexistent nobility of
Reagan's policy. On the other, he tried to prove inno-




KAL 07 Incident: Czechoslovakia
[test] Prague [no date as received] —RUDE PRAVO
said today that the transparent hysteria stirred by
Washington in connection with the disappearance of the
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South Korean plane and the [word indistinct] of people
aboard is designed to foment a new anti-Soviet and
anti-communist campaign.
While respecting all accessible facts, everyone
must be surprised that a plane equipped with the most
modern guidance apparatuses could 'by mistake' turn
500 kilometres away from its route for two hours and
not react to any signals. Can this be explained other-
wise than as a deliberate violation of international
law in the interest of someone who is concerned not
about 'humanism* but hazard? Whom such a hazard serves
is quite clear and it can be also gathered from




KAL 00 7 Incident; GDR
[Text] Good evening. The truth will out, or put
another way, the simple facts reported at yesterday's
international press conference in Moscow revealed what
the United States actually instigated on the night of
31 August to 1 September over Kamchatka and Sakhalin.
These facts were carefully checked on the spot, undeter-
red by a wave of propaganda without precedent in the
imperialist media. It dealt with the key issue: What
was the purpose of the flight by the South Korean air-
liner, what were the inevitable conclusions to be drawn
by the Soviet side about the course and behavior of
the intruder? This was made quite clear.
For, why did the intruder deviate 500 km off course
in spite of the most up-to-date navigation equipment
and radio communications which, it was proved, were
functioning? Why did the U.S. air safety control, which
followed all the stages of the flight, not sound the
alarm immediately? Why didn't the plane react to the
attempts to establish contact, which went on for hours?
Why did the intruder lost his way unerringly over mili-
tarily strategic regions? Why did it penetrate Soviet
airspace together with another espionage plane, the
RC-135, and fly so close to it that both blips merged
on the radar screen? What was the purpose of all this?
[Ref. 57]
Painting the Soviet Union as the 'incarnation of
evil ' is to indoctrinate them with the anticommunist
crusade mentality. It is to divide the Soviet people
and the other peace forces in the world. For in a
climate of anti-Soviet hatred, attacks on socialism and
on world peace can be more easily perpetrated. The
history of imperialist aggressions is tied to a chain
of intelligence provocations, from the SS campaign
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against the Gleiwitz radio station as the signal for
the attack on Poland and the unleashing of World War
II, the 'Tonkin incident' to escalate the Vietnam
War, to the latest CIA operation in the Far East.
Those who controlled them will have no scruples about the
cynical game with human lives since the nuclear first
strike which they are preparing takes into account the
destruction of the majority of mankind. One thing is
certain: As in the Gleiwitz case and in the case of
Tonkin, one day proof is going to emerge to show how
the U.S. secret service wrote and realized the- script
of the latest provocation. [Ref. 58]
10
.
KAL 00 7 Incident; Hungary
[Text] Anxieties over last week's KAL incident are
still continuing. The American side has been inciting
the media in every imaginable way. They do it, in part,
to direct the natural feelings of grief for the innocent
victims against the Soviet Union and the socialist world.
The other reason is that there is need to lay down a
smokescreen in order to divert attention from those who
had put to the gravest of risks with immeasurable cyni-
cism the lives of 269 people only to get hold of mili-
tary information that they have been unable to get for
decades through other sources.
But no matter how efficient the diversionary campaign
might be, all this does not hide the essential point:
It was not the Soviet Union or one of its allies which
penetrated several hundred miles into the U.S.' most
sensitive strategic areas—one does not need too much
imagination to assert what would be the reaction of the
Western world media in such a case—but what happened
was the opposite: A Boeing 747 equipped with the most
advanced American technology and under the command of a
pilot who was an American-trained high ranking officer
penetrated into the area of the Soviet Union's nuclear
missile system under the darkness of night, under the
supervision of the American-organized communications
system of the whole Far East, and under the authority
of an allied state. [Ref. 59J
11. KAL 00 7 Incident: Poland
The essence of the incident is formed by its two
basic features: brutal violation of USSR airspace by
American intelligence services over areas that are par-
ticularly vital for the defense of the Soviet state.
A civilian passenger aircraft was used for this pur-
pose, against every principle of international coexis-
tence and accompanied by a deliverate and cynical neglect
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of the security and lives of its passengers. Let us
add that the aircraft was not one of "theirs," because
this adds particular flavor.
The USSR is a great power that has the right and
ability to effectively defend its state interests.
The organizers of the incident cannot have considered
the very high probability that the dirty American game
which has been played could end up this way.
American imperialists have played a game without
risk, to use their own concept. If the game were to
'succeed,' they would obtain espionage information
valuable for their military preparations. If not,
they would gain a pretext to step up another anti-
Soviet and anti-communist campaign. It has no influ-
ence on the recorded facts whether. the Korean aircraft
carried out the espionage action by itself or whether
it took part in such action. [Ref. 60]
The explanations of the incident by all five states
follow the Soviet line. The aircraft was over sovereign
Soviet territory so they had the right to shoot it down.
The KAL 747 was on a spy mission which was a direct provoca-
tion of the Soviet Union by the United States. The incident
was staged by the U.S. to increase anti-Soviet feeling and
legitimize U.S. militarization. The Romanian announcements
are less inflammatory:
[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 10/9/19 83—As official fora
and international news agencies reported, a most serious
air incident took place in the Far East recently, in-
volving a South Korean airliner carrying out a flight
from New York to Seoul. In connection with this, a
statement released by the Soviet agency TASS shows:
"On the night from August 31 to September 1, a plane
intruded deep into the Soviet Union's air space over
the Okhotsk Sea and of the Island of Sakhalin.
The statement says that 'the intruder plane entered
the air space over the Kamchatka Peninsula, in a region
where the most important Soviet strategic facilities
were located. ' Next, the declaration shows: 'Since the
plane-trespasser did not obey the order to proceed to a
Soviet airfield and attempted to evade, an air defence
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interceptor carried out the order of the command post
to stop the flight.
'
The U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, stated
that 'the aircraft strayed into the Soviet airspace
over the Kamchatka Peninsula, over the Sea of Okhotsk
and over the Sakhalin Island, during a press conference.
At the same time, in another declaration, the Soviet
Government explained again how the incident occurred,
and expressed regret over the death of innocent people
and shared (Pagony) of their friends and relatives.
Such an incident—which resulted in so many casual-
ties— is, undoubtedly, most regrettable and should
make us beware. Such actions are a consequence of
the particular tension reached in the international
life, that feeds the distrust and suspicion among
states, the war psychosis, and leads to represssive
measures.
Moreover, this serious incident is used by certain
Western circles to accuse and incriminate the USSR for
the mounting tension in the international life. It is
obvious that such actions contradict the interests of
detente, of the avoidance of confrontations and the
prerequisite to peacefully solve issues. They can bring
about most serious problems in the international life,
the deterioration of the interstate relations, the
deepening of distrust, hindering the people's struggle
for peace and security.
That is why conclusions should be drawn from the
circumstances which led to this regrettable incident,
and everything possible should be done for such situa-
tions to occur no more, to be impossible in the future.
ANyhow, such a tragic event should not be used as a
reason to increase the tension. On the contrary, most
resolute action should be taken and greater efforts
should be made for the strengthening of confidence and
collaboration among states, for tangible disarmament
measures, nuclear most of all, for the cessation of the
course towards confrontation and war. iRef . 61]
Within the Romanian statement there is little
actual discussion of the specifics of the incident. They
acknowledge the aircraft as intruding into sensitive Soviet
air space and the subsequent termination of the flight but
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directly tie the statement to Soviet reports. There is no
clear accusation that the aircraft was on a spy mission or
any attempt to place blame on the East or West. The inci-
dent is portrayed as further proof of the risks of increased
tension between the superpowers and the need to reduce that
tension. The Romanian statement is extremely low-key when
compared to the other WTO member announcements
.
N. CONCLUSION
Clearly Romania's relationship with the Soviet Union is
vastly different than the Soviet relationship with the other
WTO members. While the majority of WTO members have stayed
close to the Soviet party line, Romanian policies within
the WTO and the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
has demonstrated a high degree of independent initiative.
Corresponding to the increased Romanian independence has
been the movement away from Soviet security assistance and
greater reliance on national means of defense. Conversely,
the lack of a national means of resistance and the dependence
upon Soviet military power by the other WTO members provides
a major opportunity to exercise control by the Soviet Union.
Soviet policies are aimed at intensifying East European
dependence upon the Soviet Union. In viewing the dynamic
elements of the eleven factors, Soviet policies function to
further integrate the East European defense establishments.
Ideology defines the threat and legitimizes Soviet political
leadership through socialist internationalism. The threat
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is defined along ideological lines and security is a function
of the collective nature of the socialist commonwealth.
The ideological nature of the threat discludes the primary
alternate sources and allows for Soviet pre-eminence in
doctrine which determines armaments within the alliance.
Socialist integration legitimizes Soviet hegemony over
military production with specialization functioning to mold
East European production capabilities to Soviet needs.
The future of Soviet security assistance to Eastern
Europe will therefore revolve around Soviet control.
Indigenous production will always be limited to support
equipment, small arms, and semi-obsolete items. Ideology
doctrine and training will emphasize collective security
over national interests. The Soviet arms supplied will
be modern enough to allow the WTO members to fulfill their
role within the collective doctrine, but not at the
expense of Soviet dominance. The equipment will be inferior
to that received by Soviet forces and not of the type to






Henry Kissinger ascribes three traditional purposes for
the banding together of a coalition:
1. discourage aggression by assembling superior power
and to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces.
2. provide an obligation for assistance.
3. legitimize the assistance of foreign troops or inter-
vention in a foreign country. [Ref . 62]
These traditional views on coalitions are also expounded
by the Soviets as functions of the WTO. Soviet Colonel-
General G. Sredin stated:
For a quarter of a century now the Warsaw Treaty has been
reliably serving the cause of peace and socialism.
Having appeared due to causes external to world socialism,
at the same time, it profoundly reflected the inherent
nature of the socialist socio-economic formation and
began to develop and function according to laws dia-
metrically opposite to those of the imperialist military
blocs.
The socialist countries, signatories to the Warsaw
Treaty, do not threaten anyone. The sole purpose of
their uniting into a military alliance was to defend the
gains of socialism, the freedom and independence of the
peoples, to consolidate the cause of peace in Europe
and in the whole world. Article 5 of the Treaty says
that all defensive measures of the Warsaw Treaty member-
states pursue the aim of safeguarding the peaceful labour
of their peoples, guaranteeing the inviolability of their
frontiers and territories and providing defences against
possible aggression. Article 4 likewise testifies to
the defensive Treaty Organization. It stipulates that
in case of an armed attack in Europe on one or several
Warsaw Treaty member-states by some country or goup of
countries, each signatory to the Treaty, exercising the
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right to individual or collective self-defence in accord-
ance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
shall render the state or states, subjected to such an
attack, immediate assistance individually and, in agree-
ment with the other Treaty member-states, with all means
it deems necessary to employ, including the use of
military force.
Simultaneously with the founding of the Warsaw Treaty,
its member-states established the Joint Armed Forces
comprised of national contingents detailed, by agreement
among the Treaty signatories, for conducting joint
operations
.
Having founded the Warsaw Treaty Organization, its
member-states immeasurably strengthened and consoli-
dated the defence power of the world socialist system.
The founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a
qualitatively new step in the establishment of a collec-
tive system to defend the socialist states. [Ref. 63]
The late Soviet General Sergei Shetemenko noted:
On the basis of fraternal mutual assistance, measures
are taken on strengthening the national and allied
armed forces, collective measures are taken for the
suppression of counter-revolutionary and aggressive
action against socialist countries.
Thus for example in 19 68 the state of the socialist
community provided fraternal assistance to the Czecho-
slovak people in defense of the Sovialist achievement
against encroachment by internal counter-revolution and
international reaction. [Ref. 64]
These statements demonstrate the nature of the WTO in
the Soviet view, a defensive alliance that has maintained
peace for a quarter of a century. The collective system
"immeasurably strengthened and consolidated the defensive
power of the World socialist system, inferring increased
power which discouraged aggression. Article Four obligates
the member states to assistance, "with all means it deems
necessary to employ, including the use of military forces."
Shtemenko's discussion primarily focuses on the internal
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intervention role of the WTO; "collective measures" carried
out for the "suppression" of counter-revolution. The frater-
nal assistance of arms legitimizing Soviet intervention to
protect international socialism within the Soviet bloc.
Kissinger's three traditional purposes for a coalition are
thus apparent in Soviet justification for the WTO.
Kissinger also notes that "an alliance is effective,
however, only to the extent that it reflects a common pur-
pose and that it represents an accretion of strength to its
members" [Ref
. 65] . Traditionally, the common purpose to
hold an alliance together was a common threat. Napoleon's
threat to Europe providing the common purpose for the Grand
Alliance, and Hitler's expansionism bonding the allies during
World War II. In the case of the WTO, the establishment of
Soviet style communist governments based upon an inter-
nationalized Soviet communism provide the common purpose.
Vernon Aspaturian maintains:
All of the Communist states in Eastern Europe came into
being under various forms of Soviet sponsorship. They
were all cast from the Soviet mold, and represented the
first step in universalizing the Soviet system in one
way or another. All have been beneficiaries of Soviet
protection, as well as victims of Soviet domination.
We might say that while the Communist regimes have
been the beneficiaries of Soviet protection, the
populations have been the victims of Soviet domination.
The Communist states of Eastern Europe are, in effect,
miniature alter egos of the Soviet Union, and when the
Soviet leaders look at Eastern Europe they find content-
ment only if it reflects a reasonable facsimile of them-
selves. The integrity, viability, and even existence of
the Soviet system depends upon the maintenance of the
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and thus, for
psychological reasons alone, the overthrow of any Com-
munist regime in Eastern Europe would constitute a
threat to the Soviet system. I think it's important
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to bear in mind that the Soviet Union does not consider
itself to be merely a state; it considers itself as a
representative of a particular form of social and
economic organization which has universal validity
and application. [Ref. 66]
The regimes in Eastern Europe were cast in the Soviet mold
and depend upon the Soviet Union. As miniature alter egos
of the Soviet Union, they have common values and shared
interest in the universal validity of Soviet style communism.
These shared interests provide the common purpose to main-
tain a coalition against internal counter-revolution and
external aggression by capitalist enemies. The defining
of East European interests in terms of the Socialist common-
wealth, and the Socialist commonwealth interests being defined
in terms of Soviet national interests, provide for the main-
tenance of the common purpose. As long as the Soviet Union
can maintain regimes in power which view Soviet communism
in international terms vice parochial Soviet interests,
the common purpose for the WTO will exist.
The military/strategic imperative behind Soviet arms
transfers to WTO member states rests on the second part of
Kissinger's statement, does the coalition and Soviet security
assistance "represent an accretion of strength to its members."
As discussed previously, the primary military benefit of
Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union is the strategic access
to forward deployed positions. These positions have an
offensive and defensive component, but do not depend upon
Soviet arms transfers as a quid pro quo for usage. The
proximity of Soviet power and the existance of Soviet divisions
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within the forward areas are the ultimate guarantor for the
maintenance of strategic access. Justification for arms
transfers based upon military rationales or collective
security needs to demonstrate that the transfer of arms and
subsequent increase in the recipients military power serves
also to benefit the military requirements of the supplier
state
.
This leads to two primary questions concerning the
military rationales for Soviet arms transfers to the WTO.
First, do the arms transfers increase East European military
power, and second, can East European military power be
translated into Soviet military power?
B. THE NATO VIEW
Western analysis of the WTO focuses primarily on the
forward deployed Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Seemingly,
most western military analysis uses the terms Warsaw Pact
forces and Soviet forces interchangeably. In 19 79, General
Zeiner Gundersen, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO,
commented, "It is clear that the Warsaw Pact armed forces
are becoming, year by year, step by step, a more capable,
more versatile, more flexible, better equipped, more offen-
sively oriented instrument of Soviet policy" [Ref . 67J
.
In the ensuing explanation General Gundersen proceeded to
list Pact improvements:
increase in the number of SCUD missiles to Soviet
Units in Eastern Europe




- the upgrading of SAM capabilities of Soviet Units
in Eastern Europe
- modernization of Soviet artillery units with the
receipt of self-propelled guns in Eastern Europe
the introduction of modern aircraft to Soviet East
European aviation units.
the inclusion in Soviet frontal aviation units of
the HIP and HIND attack helicopters
continued modernization of the Soviet bomber force
increase in Soviet strategic airlift capabilities.
[Ref. 68]
David Griffiths reporting on U.S. Air Force comments
concerning improvements in Warsaw Pact aviation capabilities
listed the following aircraft as the major concern: IL-76,
SU-22, MIG-27, and the SU-24 [Ref. 69]. In 1977, a report
filed after a fact finding tour by Senators Nunn and Bartlett
contended that NATO's ability to face the Warsaw Pact was
diminishing. The report pointed to the upgrading of Soviet
ground forces and the "dramatic transformation" of Soviet
tactical aviation as the prime factors [Ref. 70]
.
In Gundersen's statements, Griffith's report, and the
Senators fact finding tour the same assumptions are mani-
fest. The Warsaw Pact is increasing in military strength
and as proof of this fact increases of Soviet military power
in Eastern Europe are delineated. A recent NATO-Warsaw
pact force comparison published by NATO underscores Western
military views on the WTO [Ref. 71J . In a general comparison
67

of conventional land, sea and air forces, and overall nuclear
forces, the publication lumps Soviet and non-Soviet forces
together. Yet in specific comparisons of forces and their
capabilities, the discussion is of Soviet military capabili-
ties in Eastern Europe and not the collective WTO military
capability. Within NATO planning the non-Soviet WTO forces
seem to be a neutral factor and do not represent an accre-
tion of Soviet military power.
C. WTO DOCTRINE
Any study of the significance or military value of arms
transfers must be based on the military doctrine within
which the arms will be employed. Regardless of how modern
a piece of equipment may be, if it cannot fulfill a role in
a country's military doctrine then it is of questionable
value. A hypothetical sell of U.S. M-l tanks to El Salvador
and the Federal Republic of Germany would have two different
outcomes. In the case of the Federal Republic, the tank's
conform to current NATO doctrine and would accentuate West
German military strength. The doctrine being based on highly
mobile units in combat on the German plain against a highly
mechanized enemy. The ability to absorb an attack, and then
hold the aggressor force in bottleneck areas before they can
break out across Europe is paramount to NATO defense. High
technology items like the M-l tank fit this type of doctrine
and warfare. In El Salvador military doctrine is based upon
counter- insurgency operations. An armoured car or helicopter
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gunship would have ten times the value of an M-l tank.
Understanding the doctrine is critical to understanding
the military significance of an arms transfer.
Military doctrine within the WTO can be separated into
two schools: the Romanian and the Soviet Union. As dis-
cussed in the first section, the Romanian doctrine rests on
the concept of partisan warfare. The major concern is not
offensive operations external to Romanian territory but
defensive operations by a heavily armed public within Romania's
borders. Rather than traditional military defense, the policy
rests on the deterrence value of a popularly supported
partisan force. If the deterrence fails, then hopefully
partisan harassment will be great enough to eventually cause
the attacker to withdraw.
The second school, which is at least supported verbally
and in policy by the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
and Bulgaria, revolves around Soviet doctrines concerning
offensive operations, deep penetration and tactical use of
nuclear weapons. As Chris Jones points out in his study,
the military doctrines of the above five states are standar-
dized and controlled by the Soviet Union [Ref . 72] . The
doctrine rejects the partisan warfare of Romania and requires
each member to integrate itself into a single functioning
unit, the greater the defense capabilities of the coalition
as a whole. Since the Soviet Union is the preeminent power
in the coalition and has greater military resources to draw
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from, she leads in the formulation of doctrine. Marshal
Grechko stated:
The working out of the questions of modern military
theory is the result of the close cooperation of the
scholars of the allied armed forces.
The availability of the extremely rich military
experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and of its first-
class material technical base and of its well-trained
military cadres—all this guarantees Soviet military
scholars an avante guard role in the resolution of the
problematic tasks of military science. [Ref . 73]
Socialist internationalism requires the bonding together of
the Socialist states to protect the socialist commonwealth
from capitalist forces. Socialist specialization of labor
requires each member to integrate its national assets into
the commonwealth for the greater good. Since the Soviet
Union is the ideological leader and primary economic/military
power within the commonwealth, she obviously is in the best
position to guide the socialist commonwealth on its histori-
cal journey.
Chris Jones points to the Soviet preeminence over WTO
doctrine and maintains that the doctrine is an instrument of
Soviet control. By accepting a security policy based upon
the socialist commonwealth, the members foresake a posture
b^sed upon national interests. Their defense posture is so
integrated into the Warsaw Pact that the national military
assets cannot function outside the WTO. The individual
members are devoid of the means to defend themselves and
therefore must submit to the will of Moscow [Ref. 74 J . Though
Jones may be correct, the question of importance for this
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section concerns the success of the integration. The Soviets
may have succeeded in negating the national defense capa-
bilities of the WTO member states through a doctrine of
collective security, but does this mean the corollary is also
true; does the defense contributions of the WTO members
realistically represent an accretion of power to the coali-
tion and consequently to the Soviet Union?
Soviet military doctrine in clausewitzian style renders
military force as a tool of politics and further maintains
that the essence of this relationship does not change with
new technology. The third edition of Soviet Military
Strategy states:
In his remarks on Clausewitz ' book, On War , v. 1,
Lenin stresses that politics is the reason, and war is
only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently,
it remains only to subordinate the military point of view
to^the political. [Ref. 75]
In the same edition it is stated concerning Western views that
"atomic weapons have introduced radical changes into the form
of war and its relation to policits" the Soviets maintain:
It is quite evident that such views are a consequence of
a metaphysical and unscientific approach to such a
social phenomenon as war, and are as a result of ideali-
zation of the new weapons. It is well known that the
essence of war as a continuation of politics does not
change with changing technology and armament. [Ref. 76J
Regardless of nuclear weapons, war and force are still a
function of politics.
In his publication, "The Offensive," A. A. Sidorenko
further outlines Soviet military strategy:
The Leninist ideas of the decisiveness of the offensive
in armed conflict find reflection in Soviet military
doctrine which considers the offensive as the basic type
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of combat actions of troops. Only a decisive offensive
conducted at high rates and to a great depth achieves
the complete smashing of the enemy in short times and
the seizure of important areas, objectives, and politi-
cal and economic centers. [Ref. 77]
The key to warfare is seen as quick, decisive offensive
action. Combined arms, including nuclear weapons, inten-
sify the capabilities of the offensive to quickly defeat
the enemy forces and seize the decisive objectives. Sidorenko
states:
The introduction of nuclear missiles into troop units
and the improvement of present types and appearance of
new types of conventional weapons and combat equipment
have made fundamental changes in the character, methods,
and forms of the attack.
The goal of the attack—total defeat of the enemy in
short periods of time and the seizure of important
areas—now is achieved by the destruction of the main
enemy groupings and his means of mass destruction, pri-
marily nuclear weapons, and also by the powerful fire of
other means, the swift attack of tank and motorized rifle
troops to a great depth in coordination with aviation
and airborne landings, and by their bold movement to the
flanks and rear of the enemy. [Ref. 78J
Sidorenko goes to great effort to demonstrate that nuclear
weapons are just one facet of the increased capabilities of
the offensive. The nuclear weapons remove the enemy's
nuclear capability and destroy main centers of enemy de-
fense. This intern opens up the enemy defensive lines
allowing for the conventional forces to exploit the military
situation. Sidorenko states:
At the present time, tank troops are the main shock
force of the ground troops. Thanks to their high com-
bat qualities, they are capable of exploiting the results
of the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of
destruction most effectively, overcoming the enemy's
defense at a high rate, breaking through into his deep
rear swiftly, advancing over any terrain including that
72

contaminated with radioactive substances, and inflicting
powerful blows on the enemy. Swiftly reaching the areas
struck by nuclear bursts, the tank troops will complete
the smashing of the opposing enemy forces, seize his
vitally important objectives and territory, prevent the
enemy's restoration of the combat efficiency of his
troops, defeat the employment of his mobilization reserves,
and thereby further the rapid attainment of the goals
of the offensive. [Ref. 79]
An important quality of aviation is its capability
to discover independently and immediately destroy enemy
means of nuclear attack. Along with the accomplishment
of many fire missions, in the course of the offensive
aviation will conduct aerial reconnaissance to a great
depth, cover the trooos against enemy air strikes, sup-
port the landing and actions of airborne forces and the
rapid maneuver of podrazdeleniye, deliver ammunition
and material to the attacking troops, and accomplish
other varied missions. [Ref. 80]
The combined conventional forces quickly and decisively de-
feat the enemy and reach their objectives as the nuclear
forces negate enemy nuclear power. The essence of the con-
ventional forces is high mobility, firepower, and deep
penetration capabilities.
Soviet views on the political military relationship,
the offensive as the decisive form of military action, the
relevance of nuclear power, and the use of conventional
force all interrelate to help determine armament decisions.
Military force is not renounced by the Soviets but seen
still as a continuation of politics. If military action is
resorted to, then quick, deep-penetrating offensive action
is the most decisive form of warfare. Seemingly NATO forces
would have to be destroyed and Western Europe occupied prior
to the war escalating into a general strategic nuclear ex-
change. Nuclear weapons within the European theater function
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first to deter NATO use of nuclear weapons and second to
destroy NATO nuclear capabilities prior to its use. J.J.
Martin maintains:
The Soviets believe that nuclear weapons have great
military importance and that decisive military advantages
can be gained by the side that use's them first. Even if
a NATO-WP war begins conventionally, the Soviets believe
that NATO would be forced to use nuclear weapons, that
the Warsaw Pact must make every effort to preempt NATO's
nuclear use, and that the Warsaw Pact must be prepared to
win a nuclear war with NATO, in the sense of occupying
Western Europe and recovery rapidly from the war.
[Ref. 81]
In essence, deterrence and then preemption opens the way
for the conventional forces to rapidly occupy Western Europe
intact.
Soviet weapons development since the 19 60's has followed
Soviet doctrine. The Soviet ability to match or exceed U.S.
nuclear power in the strategic, theater and tactical fields
has given them control of the escalation ladder and improved
the environment for their conventional forces. In conjunction
with their increasing nuclear capability, the Soviets have
also qualitatively improved upon their conventional forces.
In a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report, Philip
Petersen and Mayor John Hines support the view that Soviet
doctrine is based upon quick, deep penetration conventional
offensives backed by nuclear weapons. They state:
In the Soviet view, the successful execution or a short
conventional war requires a high-speed offensive operation
characterized by deep penetration of NATO's defense in
the first few days of the war. Critical military, politi-
cal and economic objectives must be quickly seized or
destroyed through a combination of massed fire strikes
and exploitation maneuvers executed in close coordination
with airborne and heliborne assault landings.
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The Soviets anticipate NATO escalation to nuclear
use, and therefore plan to operate from a 'nuclear
threatened' posture even during nonnuclear combat. In
this way they hope to minimize the difficulty of transi-
tion to nuclear warfare. [Ref. 82]
In light of the doctrine, Petersen and Hines then discuss
current Soviet arms modernization programs
:
Weapons modernization and changes in force structure
evident in the Soviet air, ground, and missile forces
in recent years are interrelated and clearly enhance
Soviet capabilities to execute the complex, high-speed
conventional operations which are being discussed with
ever-increasing frequency by Soviet/Warsaw Pact mili-
tary leaders. [Ref. 83]
In support of this statement Petersen and Hines point to
specific Soviet arms programs and their effect. Concerning
aviation assets they state:
Until Soviet Frontal Aviation began to receive its cur-
rent generation of aircraft, a Soviet air operation
against NATO air and nuclear assets probably would have
been ineffective. Soviet tactical aircraft in the 1960s
were characterized by light bomb loads and short range.
But Soviet units, and even some units of the Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact states, have been equipped with increasingly
more capable and sophisticated aircraft. New fighters
like the MiG-23/FLOGGER G and fighter-bombers like the
MiG-27/FLOGGER D have reduced the degree to which the
West has been able to count on technology as a force
multiplier to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.
Even those NATO efforts to offset this superiority
through technologically advanced weapon systems like the
acquisition of the F-15 and F-16 in significant numbers,
may be offset by new Soviet airframes under development.
Along with the fighters and fighter-bombers of Frontal
Aviation, an air operation would include bombers not
withheld for intercontinental strikes or participation in
other operations . While the Soviets have long had the
Yak-28/BREWER, the Tu-16/BADGER, and the Tu-22-BLINDER,
the acquisition of the Su-24/FENCER and Tu- 2 2M/BACKFIRE
has dramatically improved their capability to conduct
deep-theater strikes. The BACKFIRE also contributes
additional flexibility in that it can fly with continen-
tal theater assets or with the longer range bombers
against either targets in an oceanic TVD or possibly
against intercontinental targets. Thus, in terms of
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continental theater aviation organizational develop-
ments, the Soviets have increased their firepower,
survivability, and flexibility with a modernization
program running from FLOGGERs, FENCERs, and BACKFIRES
to more advanced airframes, such as the SU-27/Flanker
and MiG-29 Fulcrum. [Ref . 84]
They further discuss Soviet missile modernization:
The Soviets have also begun to deploy a new family of
more accurate theater missiles. H* These new systems
are said to incorporate improvements in reaction time,
missile accuracy, and handling characteristics. Older
FROG rockets are being replaced by the SS-21, the liquid-
propelled SS-lc/SCUD B by the SS-23, and the SS-12/
SCALEBOARD by the SS-22.J-16 Until these weapons appeared,
the air operation was threatened by the lack of assurance
that theater missiles could be used successfully to
support air and air defense operations . H7 Yet any
Soviet Eurospecific military strategy which hoped to
avoid nuclear escalation within a European theater of
military operations required a "Eurostrategic" nuclear
capability that could survive an initial surprise nuclear
strike and still deliver a devastating retaliation.
Compounding NATO targeting problems because of its
mobility, the SS-20 mobile IRBM helps extract the Soviets
from the 'use or lose' situation inherent in the fixed
site of the SS-4 and SS-5 that formerly made any attempt
to fight without nuclear weapons so risky. [Ref. 85]
Modernization of the ground forces follow the same trend.
The T-72 tank quickly followed by the T-80, a tank outfitted
for chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. Increased
development of armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled
guns, and helicopters, all fitting into a doctrine of
mobility and deep penetration.
Modernization of Soviet forces has occurred across the
board in conventional and nucelar forces, and has been
taking place at an increasingly rapid pace since the 19 6Q's.
Clearly, the modernization process corresponds with Soviet
military doctrine and represents an increase in Soviet
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offensive capabilities. Since as previously discussed,
Soviet doctrine is essentially the WTO doctrine, and the
Soviet Union is the primary arms supplier, then the degree
the Soviets help the WTO to modernize and function within
the doctrin should be an indicator of the strength of the
military/strategic rationale in Soviet arms transfers.
D. WTO AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS
Prior to 19 60, the East European armies were empty shells
under Soviet control. Development and modernization did not
begin until after Khrushchev's decision to reorganize the
military. The reorganization heavily emphasized the newly
created strategic rocket forces to the detriment of the tra-
ditional ground forces. The development of the East Euro-
pean armies was seen as a means of pacifying the supporters of
Soviet conventional forces. By developing non-Soviet conven-
tional assets, strong ground forces would still be in place
defensively in Eastern Europe and Soviet resources would then
be freed to develop the more important nuclear forces. In
effect, Khrushchev began a policy of burden sharing within
the WTO. Thomas Wolfe notes that in the early 1960 's Soviet
military policy in Eastern Europe shifted. Prior to 1960,
the primary Soviet military concern in Eastern* Europe was
the establishment of forward air fields and a coordinated air
defense system. After 1960, the Soviets began upgrading
ground forces and ground support aircraft. The introduction
of T-54/T-55 tanks, self propelled guns, MiG-21, and Su-7
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fighter-bomber aircraft demonstrated the desire to provide
an increased conventional capability for the East European
Armies. Wolfe maintains that Khrushchev's motives were
made up of both international and internal factors. Inter-
nationally, development of non-Soviet WTO armies demonstrated
bloc solidarity and downplayed the concrete military signs
of Soviet hegemony. Within the WTO, the further development
and integration of the national armies into the Soviet defense
system enhanced Soviet effort of political control and in-
creased discipline by drawing the bloc together. Wolfe states
that concerning internal politics, non-Soviet WTO military
development was used as an added rationale to trim back Soviet
ground force requirements. Wolfe maintains that in retro-
spect the East European forces were modernized but there
was little effect on the cutting back of Soviet ground forces
[Ref. 86]
.
Since the 19 60's, non Soviet WTO military modernization
has slowed and has not kept pace with their Soviet counter-
parts. Table VIII reflects the relative military balance of
major components of the WTO members as of 1982. Strategic
capabilities were not compared in the chart since the Soviet
Union is the only WTO state to maintain strategic forces.
Though the East Europeans maintain the SCUD missile which has
nuclear capability, all reports indicate that the Soviets
maintain the nuclear warheads. It is suspected that the
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SCUD has a range of 100-170 miles which makes it a battle-
field weapon and not strategic. The Soviet Union controls
all nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems.
In the tank category, though the East Europeans operate
the T-72, the majority of their assets are the T-62 and older
T-54/55. The T-64, which with the T-72 is considered the
forerunner of the T-80, has never been transferred to the
East Europeans [Ref . 87] . Table IX is a breakdown of Soviet




Operational WTO on Operational
Tank Date Receipt Tank Date
T-62 1961 1969 T-64/T-72 T-64 late 1960's
T-72 early 1970'
s
T-64 late 1960's - T-80 early 1980's
T-72 early 1970's 1979 T-80 early 1980's
Sources: SIPRI yearbooks: 1970-1982.
Defense Intelligence Report, "Warsaw Pact




The chart clearly supports Micahel Checkinski's allegation
that the Soviets supply Europe with equipment a generation
behind Soviet top of the line items [Ref. 88]. The T-62 was
not transferred until the T-64 was in production and the T-72
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was about to begin production. The T-72 is just beginning
to show up in Eastern Europe in larger numbers while the
Soviets were switching to the T-80. The T-80 is fully
configured to operate in the chemical, biological, nuclear
environment that Soviet doctrine prescribes.
Two points stand out under the aircraft heading in Table
VIII. First, the lack of long range interdiction type air-
craft in the non-Soviet WTO inventories. None of the East
European members operate anything near the range/payload
capabilities of the Backfire bomber. The aircraft operated
all fit interceptor or direct ground attack roles with no
capability to attack rear area targets. Second, as Table
X demonstrates, the interceptor and ground attack aircraft
operated are of limited capability when compared to the
Soviet inventory. The mainstay of the East European inter-
ceptor force is the MiG-21, the Soviets are already develop-
ing the MiG-29 a full two generations beyond the MiG-21.
In the ground attack role the East European mainstay is the
SU-7BM with the SU-20 just recently being introduced. The
SU-20 and the Soviet Air Force SU-^17 are similar aircraft and
direct descendents of the SU-7BM. The SU-20 is an export
variant of the SU-17 with the primary differences being down^
graded engines and avionics [Ref . 89 J . So while the Soviets
had developed the SU-17, MiG-27, SU-24, SU-19 and are develop-
ing the SU-2 5, the aircraft they decide to supply the WTO





SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT
MILITARY 1 MISSION ...1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 | 1980...
WTO Interceptor
MIG-21 MIG-21PF MIG-21MF MIG-21 BIS
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SU-7BCBM) - - >
SU-17 - - >
MIG-27- - >
SU-24 - - *
SU-19 - - »
SU-25
New design; follow on aircraft.
> Variant of same design.
i *The SU-20 is more than just a modification of the SU-7BM but not quite a total
; redesign. The SU-20 has upgraded avionics, swing wing and twice the load capa-
' bility of the SU-7BM but basic fuselage design is the same. The SU-20 is an
export version (with down graded avionics) of the SU-17 used by the Soviet air
force.
Sources: (1) Military Balance ; years 1965-1982, 1155.
(2) SIPRI, yearbooks; 1968-1982.
(3) soviet Military Power , 2nd edition, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D .C., 1983 .
(4) Jane's, All the Worlds Aircraft , years 1965-1983, Jane's
Publishing Co., London England.
(5) Soviet Air Power , Bill Sweetman, Bill Gunston, Salamander
Books Limited, London, England, 1978.
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The surface to air category seemingly follows the same
trend as Soviet tank exports; as a new model is developed,
the older generation is disseminated to the WTO. Table XI
traces current Soviet SAM exports to the WTO. The 300 mile
range SA-5 which has been exported to Syria, though operated
by Soviet personnel, has never been released to the WTO.
The short-range hand-held SA-7's and SA-9 ' s were deleted from
the table since they are a common missile and not a major
item. Of the missiles exported to the WTO the SA-2 was the
mainstay until the introduction of the SA-3's, 4's and 6's
in 19 77. As the table depicts the follow on missiles were
TABLE XI

















SA-3 1961 1977 SA-11 1979
SA-4 1964 1977 SA-10 early 1980'
SA-6 1970 1977 SA-11 1979
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks: 1970-1982
Military Balance : 11SS, years 1965 to 1982.
within 2-4 years of entry into the Soviet inventory. In
the case of the SA-3 and SA-4, a period 16 years and 13 years
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respectively passed between the Soviet operational date and
entry into the non-Soviet WTO forces.
In surface to surface missiles, the Soviets have never
upgraded the Frog and Scud systems supplied in the 1960's.
Though the Soviets have developed four follow on variants in
the SS-12, SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23, the East Europeans have
not acquired any of the new versions. The Soviet have ex-
ported the SS-21* s to Syria but have reserved control of
the missiles in Eastern Europe to themselves [Ref . 9 0J «
In the naval category the Soviets maintain blue water
capabilities while the other WTO members maintain coastal
patrol fleets. The developing Soviet naval capability to
project marine forces ashore and operate surface battle groups
at sea is unmatched by any other WTO member
,
E. ANALYSIS
Comparing the WTO/Soviet offensive doctrine with non-
Soviet military hardware highlights a disparity between
capabilities and doctrine. Within the WTO, the state that
developed the doctrine and defined the security policy is the
only state with the capabilities to carry out the doctrine.
In the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, long-range
interdiction aircraft, survivable highly mobile ground forces,
air superiority aircraft and ground attack aircraft the Soviets
have modernized to meet doctrinal requirements. The East
Europeans though have lagged behind in all areas which brings
into question their role in the WTO.
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Four broad factors may have an effect on East European
modernization programs; reliability, economics, desirability
and assimilation. The scope of this study is not adequate
to fully cover one, let alone all four, of these topics but
they still must be touched upon in viewing Soviet arms trans-
fers to the WTO from a collective security perspective.
Reliability primarily effects the supplier and concerns what
arms he is willing to transfer. Economics, desirability and
assimilation concern the recipient; what is desired? Can it
be afforded? Can the state actually use and maintain the
equipment?
In general terms, Soviet perceptions of the reliability
of the WTO members does affect her arms transfer policy.
Robert Dean points to the lack of Soviet support in the
19 50's for the development of an independent East German
military as a function of reliability. He states:
Following the anti-regime demonstrations which shook
the state in June 19 53, initial Soviet sponsorship
for the development of the GAR military appears to
have been withdrawn. A small fleet of modern MiG-15's
which was to serve as the core of the newly constituted
East German Air Force was recalled, and other training
organizational development in process war curtailed.
Soviet restriction on GDR military development apparently
continued well beyond the formal establishment of the
NPS in 1956. Gradually, however, Soviet confidence in
the East German Party leadership and in the political
and social stability of the 'second German itate ' grew,
and was evidently sufficient by the early 19 60's to
warrant full support of a separate GDR military estab-
lishment. [Ref. 91]
Czechoslovakia in 19 68 further demonstrates that relia-
bility is a factor. After the invasion, reductions in
Czech force and equipment levels were offset by increases
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in Soviet troops [Ref. 92]. Since the Czechoslovakian forces
proved unreliable, the Soviets degraded the Czech military
capabilities while still maintaining WTO capabilities with
the addition of Soviet troops. Reliability and East Euro-
pean modernization is a difficult problem for the Soviets.
As Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes point out in their study
on East European political reliability, the Soviets are caught
in a dilemma. The perceived instability of some ofthe regimes
requires the Soviets to proceed with caution in their moderni-
zation efforts. WTO policies of integration and increased
East European input into the WTO decision-making process
will eventually increase the efficacy of the institution and
reliability of the individual members. But, "a failure to
supply modern weapons to these forces because of their
limited reliability might have removed an important motiva-
tion for closer ties with Moscow on the part of East Euro-
pean military elites and in the end become a self-fulfilling
prophecy" iRef. 93] . Herspring and Volgyes maintain that
though the Soviets have modernized East European forces, the
failure to supply the latest equipment has created resentment.
Economically, the question arises concerning the ability
of the small East European states to afford the armaments.
Detente in the 19 70's simultaneously decreased East-West
tensions and opened Eastern Europe to Western trade. Trade
with the West had a dual effect—first, an increase in hard
currency balance of payments problems, and second, an influx
of western technology and industry. The belief was that as
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the industries were rebuilt with modernwestern technology the
manufactured items would then be competitive in the inter-
national marketplace and the initial hard currency debt could
be repaid. Internal economic structural problems, technology
assimilation problems, and the huge increases in the cost
of oil , all contributed to the demise of the East European
economic policies and the resultant increase in the hard
currency deficits discussed in Chapter II. As the economic
problems increased, the ability to support a large military
decreased. In 19 79, Poland, following Romania's lead, froze
their defense budget despite Soviet requests for budget in-
creases [Ref. 94 J . Though in the same period East Germany
has moved to increase defense spending, it is doubtful con-
sidering the state of the WTO economics, that overall the
East European states can realistically support a larger
share of the defense burden {Ref. 9 5J
.
The acquisition of arms is not solely based upon the
recipients ability to finance the purchase. If it deems
necessary, the Soviet Union can subsidize the modernization
of the East European forces. The question of Soviet subsi-
dies to East Europe and the degree East Europe is a burden
to the Soviet economy is a difficult question. As Michael
Checinski maintains, the inter-locking relationship between
the WTO economies through the CMEA have made it difficult to
determine who benefits {Ref. 96] . The Soviets subsidize oil
to Eastern Europe and buy East European equipment at inflated
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prices. The Soviets also have a closed arms market in East
Europe and inflate the cost of the arms to the WTO members
[Ref. 97], Overall, the Soviet Union does subsidize the East
European economies. Jan Vanous and Michael Marrese place the
subsidies in the neighborhood of 5 . 8 billion dollars for
1974-1978, rising to 10.4 billion in 1979, and 21.7 in 1980
[Ref. 9 8] . Considering Soviet subsidies and current East
European economic problems, why purchase second rate equipment
when state of the art is available? Though economics can
explain some of the discrepencies between Soviet and WTO
force levels and equipment, it cannot be the entire answer.
Part of the rationale for weapons standardization, aside from
the obvious military benefits, is the decrease in development
and production costs. Regardless of the size of their defense
budgets, the East European states are contributing to develop-
ment and production costs and yet are not receiving any of
the top of the line equipment.
The assimilation factor refers to the capability of a
state to accept, use, and maintain high tech equipment. If
their pilots can not fly World War II fighters, then there
is little military rationale in supplying the country with
MiG-29's. While assimilation may be a problem in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, there is no question that East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Poland could operate and maintain the most
sophisticated of Soviet equipment. Czechoslovakia and Poland
both have an aircraft industry and produce armored vehicles.
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East Germany is in the forefront of the WTO in robotics,
electronics miniturization, and nuclear engineering. East
Germany has also operated in the third world instructing on
Soviet equipment for the Soviet Union. Assimilation of high
tech equipment is not a problem with Eastern Europe.
Under desirability, the East Europeans have demonstrated
a desire to obtain top of the. line equipment. In fact, Herspring
and Volgyes report that "Moscow's failure to supply these
armed forces with the latest weapons appears to have created
resentment on the part of some of the Eastern European mili-
tary elites" [Ref. 99]. A. Ross Johnson maintains that the
Polish military has expressed dissatisfaction over the pace
of modernization. In the 1960's, they were upset with the
Soviets supplying Middle Eastern client states before Poland.
In the 19 70 's, the dissatisfaction was with the state of the
Polish economy and the decrease in defense expenditures [Ref.
10 0] . East German pronouncements on increased defense expen-
ditures and warnings of West German militarization all indi-




Soviet arms transfers within the WTO are not meant to
maximize the combat ability of the non Soviet WTO armies.
The WTO armies can assimilate the weapons, economically they
can better utilize their defense expenditures than current
policies dictate, and they do have a desire to modernize their
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equipment. The major holdback is the restrictions the Soviets
place on what arms can be exported to the WTO. From the
military perspective, Soviet arms transfers fit three roles.
First, it gives the non-Soviet WTO armies the capability with
standardized weapons to protect the lines of communication
between the probable front lines and the Soviet Union.
Questions of reliability focus on the use of WTO troops in
offensive combat external to the nation or in the case of
the Soviet Union losing the war. In a major offensive in
Europe, the Soviets will be carrying out the majority of the
combat. As long as they are winning, reliability among the
WTO members should be high. The WTO armies under Soviet con-
trol would function on national territory protecting the vital
lines of communication from both air and ground interdiction.
Second, the WTO armies with Soviet assistance do form an
effective defensive force and buffer against NATO invasion.
In defense of national territory reliability should be high.
The equipment maintained by the non-Soviet WTO military forces
is sophisticated enough to represent an accretion of power
to the Soviet military in a defensive role. Third, moderniza-
tion helps accomplish the internal policeman role. The equip-
ment is modernized enough to allow WTO forces to participate
and therefore legitimize internal intervention. Soviet
dominance of the national defenseorgans decreases the
ability for national defense, while the integration and
standardization policies increase the capabilities of the
remaining WTO members to participate in any intervention.
9Q

Though the Soviets have not modernized the WTO armies to
the degree possible, this does not mean that they do not
invision the WTO as a traditional coalition or that the WTO
members do not represent an accretion of power to the Soviet
Union. Soviet integration and therefore modernization poli-
cies are based upon the desire to harness and maximize East
European military capabilities but without losing sight of
the reliability problem. Currently, the reliability of the
WTO armies, or at least the ability of the Soviets to con-
trol the WTO armies in defensive operations, is high. The
armies are modernized and allowed access to equipment that
enhances their defensive capabilities. Offensively, the
Soviets are manned at levels to carry out operations primarily
on a unilateral basis. The primary contribution of the WTO
in this case is strategic access to the forward areas. From
the military perspective there will be little change in the
future. The only occurrence that could possibly change the
situation would be complete military integration into a
supra-national defensive organization. The Soviets have
periodically introduced this concept only to be rebuffed
by the WTO members. As long as the military organizations
are national in structure, Soviet questions concerning





Geoffrey Kemp and Steven Miller associate five economic
rationales for the transfer of arms [Ref . 102J . First, arms
sales contribute to a favorable balance of payments. Second,
arms sales help reduce unit cost and distribute research and
development expenses. Third, military sales help stimulate
commercial sales between supplier and recipient. Fourth,
arms sales help reduce unemployment, and fifth, arms can
be used as a barter item for resources. Though some of
these five items are relevant to Soviet third world arms sales,
they have only a limited relevancy to Soviet transfer within
the WTO. The primary economic rationale for WTO transfer
lies outside Kemp and Miller's five rationales and is a func-
tion of the unique structure of the Soviet political-economic-
military entity. The development of the Soviet Union, defined
by John Hardt, as a military- industrial complex has created a
privileged class whose position is dependent upon a large
military sector [Ref. 103] . Eastern Europe provides a demand
for Soviet arms, justifiable on Soviet national security
grounds, that legitimizes the large military-industrial
sector and therefore the continued privileged status of its
members. This is not meant to present a case of interest
group politics in the mirror image of the United States but
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to demonstrate the incorporated nature of the Soviet
political -economic-military system.
B. THE FIVE RATIONALES
The use of arms sales to improve a trade deficit or as a
means for acquiring hard currency is a motivator of Soviet
arms sales to the third world but not within the WTO. Table
XII demonstrates the relative importance of Soviet arms
sales to the WTO and to less developed countries (LDC)
.
Where arms sales consistently comprise only 8 percent of total
Soviet exports to the WTO, arms transfer to the LDC ' s consti-
tute a whopping one to two thirds of total exports. Except
for the years 19 71, 19 72, and 19 73, Soviet trade balances
with the WTO have remained positive. The primary factor
for Soviet trade surpluses with the WTO is the Soviet expor-
tation of oil . The negative trade balances of the early
seventies were offset by a readjustment of the price index
system within the WTO. By adjusting oil prices closer to the
world price levels the Soviets reestablished the trade sur-
plus. As discussed earlier, the Soviets overall are seen as
subsidizing Eastern Europe. Arms sales only increase the
subsidy cost to the Soviets and therefore their effect on
the trade balance is not an imperative of arms transfers.
Considering Eastern Europe's current hard currency deficit
and the fact that trade within the WTO is based on standard
rubles, the acquisition of hard currency is also not a factor.
Unit cost reduction and the distribution of research
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answer. Andrew Pierre maintains that Soviet armament indus-
tries are not subject to the economic pressures of the West,
but partially because of their WTO market. He states:
Nor are the lower unit production costs, attribu-
table to exports, likely to be considered of signifi-
cance. The number of weapons sent to the developing
world, in relation to those produced for the armed
forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, has not
been large enough to have had a significant impact on
production costs; until the mid 19 60's many of these
arms came from surplus stocks . Our knowledge of the
inner workings of the Soviet 'military industrial
complex 1 is quite limited, as it remains surrounded
in secrecy. Yet it appears that the arms production
industry is geared to a steady rate of production,
and weapons systems do not have to have promising
export potential to be developed because of the large
demand for arms already existing within the Warsaw
Pact. [Ref. 104]
In effect he feels the arming of the Soviet military and
the Warsaw Pact forces keeps production constant and de-
creases unit cost.
Michael Checinski indirectly supports Pierre's contention
that sales to Eastern Europe do decrease unit price and
contribute to research and development costs. Checinski
feels that though the Soviets do not supply the most
sophisticated equipment to Eastern Europe, the equipment that
is bought and the infrastructure developed is strictly for
Soviet defense and not European national defense. According
to Checinski the Soviets over-charge for their military equip-
ment and in many cases require cut prices in European
component equipment in exchange for arms. The defense
budgets of the East European states are oriented to improving
the Soviet defense network, and therefore release Soviet
95

assets for continued research and development and production
of sophisticated arms.
As demonstrated earlier, the Soviets do not transfer
their most sophisticated arms to Eastern Europe. In the
case of aircraft and surface to surface missiles, the gap
between Soviet capabilities and the rest of the WTO is
notably acute. This would indicate that sales to Eastern
Europe do not contribute to decreasing Soviet research and
development expenses or unit cost. It is in the new techno-
logically advanced systems that the Soviets do not supply
that R&D costs and unit production are the most critical.
Yet, Pierre and Checinski have a point, sales to Eastern
Europe do economically benefit Soviet defense development.
In armor equipment, the sale of relatively obsolete equipment
produces funds for production and R&D for further generations.
The use of the national defense budget of Europe to build
the infrastructure in airfields, pipelines, roads, and rail-
roads releases Soviet resources. The development in Poland
and Czechoslovakia of what Checinski refers to as an "obso-
lete reserve production capability" releases Soviet industrial
capabilities to produce the more modernized systems [Ref
.
10 5] . The East Europeans pick up the tail end of the WTO
market and Soviet parts support while Soviet industry produces
the new generation of military equipment. Though not in
the traditional sense of joint development or decreases in
unit cost, Soviet arms sale to Eastern Europe do indirectly
function to defray the cost of Soviet arms development.
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The linkage of arms sales and commercial sales is not a
factor in Soviet arms transfer to Eastern Europe. The Coun-
cil of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) coordinates trade
between memger states and all of the WTO members belong to
the CMEA. As in the WTO, the Soviets have consistently
advocated a policy of integration within the CMEA. Eastern
Europe's dependence upon Soviet resources, the lack of goods
competitive on the world market, and increasing trade deficits
with the west, all contribute to further the integration
process and stimulate intra-CMEA trade. Since the Soviets
have a direct instrument in the CMEA, they do not need to
rely on indirect linkages between military and commercial
sales to spur trading.
The effects of unemployment also has little impact on
arms sales to Eastern Europe. Andrew Pierre states, "In a
state controlled economy like the Soviet Union's, with its
shortage of skilled manpower, maintaining levels of employment
is not a factor in exports, especially in the highly favored
defense industry" [Ref . 10 6 J . Ann Goodman and Geoffrey
Scheifer in their study of the Soviet labor market support
Pierre's contention. They state:
The Soviet economy, constrained for many years—but
especially recently, by sluggish growth, now must cope
with a second problem, a sharp slowdown in annual in-
crements to the population of working age. The
prospect of a labor shortage is especially painful for
Soviet planners, because up to now the share of labor's
contribution to growth generally has been larger than
in other developed economies, while the contribution
of productivity has been smaller. Moscow counts on
turning this situation around in the 1980 's, relying
more on productivity and less on numbers to spur




The defense industry requires skilled workers to produce
quality sophisticated armaments. The increasing shortage
of skilled labor within the Soviet Union negates unemploy-
ment concerns as a factor in Soviet arms transfers.
A strong case supporting Soviet arms for resources
relative to Eastern Europe does not exist. The Soviet
Union is the major resource supplier to Eastern Europe. The
resource trade is coordinated by the CMEA and is usually
paid for in standard rubles or through joint investment
projects. The exchange of arms for resources, other than
in overall trade balance calculations, does not figure in
CMEA calculation.
Of Kemp and Miller's five economic rationales for arms
transfer, only sales to decrease unit cost and R&D expenses
hold any validity for Eastern Europe. Even in this case,
the sales contribute indirectly to defray Soviet defense
expenses and do not overall have a direct impact on unit
cost estimates. The five rationales do not take into con-
sideration political-economic ties and benefits which produce
an imperative for arms transfer. The imperative provided by
the existence within the Soviet Union of a sector dependent
upon defense and defense industries for political-economic
power
.
C. SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
A study of the military-industrial connection must re-
volve around three essential questions. First, what is a
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military-industrial complex? Second, does a military-
industrial complex exist in the Soviet Union? Third, does the
military-industrial complex have an input in the political
decision-making process? If a military-industrial complex
with access to the decision-making process does exist in the
Soviet Union, then this complex must have an interest in arms
sales and military-industrial development in Eastern Europe.
Eastern Europe provides a closed market for Soviet arms which
then necessitates a large military-industrial capability.
Production capabilities must be large enough to supply the
Soviet and the WTO armies. The structure of the economic
bonus system in the Soviet Union places a premium on increased
production of output. Sales to Eastern Europe legitimizes
the large production capabilities, and therefore managerial
bonuses, by providing an additional consumer for Soviet arms.
Egbert Jahn views concepts of a military-industrial
complex as primarily a capitalist phenomenon. He maintains
that the popularity among bourgeois social scientists of
military-industrial complex theories was an outgrowth of the
Indochina War and the need for a scapegoat. Jahn states:
The search to find the persons responsible for a
policy whose consequences even more flagrantly
contradicted the self-image and ideals of a bourgeois
democracy and which inflicted defeats in foreign
policy, national humiliation, and sharpening of social
conflicts at home did not, however, lead to a funda-
mental critique of bourgeois society but to finding
a scapegoat. The scapegoat chosen by the bourgeois
for its act of self-criticism, corresponding to a
certain depersonalizing and sociologizing of the histori-
cal understanding of bourgeois liberals, was not, as in
former times, individuals, but a small group of persons
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who because of their profession openly and, to an extent,
tangibly profited from the war: the professional mili-
tary and the defense contractors, as well as their
mouthpieces in the government, the administration and
the national parties. [Ref. 108]
Jahn argues that the purpose of the military-industrial
critique which argues for the elimination of corruption and
profit in reality has two goals. First, to more effectively
utilize the defense sector, and second, once defense is
assured to release excess resources to other sectors. In
effect Jahn maintains that the discussion of a military
industrial complex is a further capitalist means of insuring
political control. By developing a theory which explains
abhorrent policy as the encroachment of a military-industrial
interest group on the legitimate decision-making process,
the real power-brokers divert attention from the actual prob-
lems inherent in a bourgeois society {Ref. 109 J
.
William Tee defines the military industrial complex in
terms of the broad spectrum of "people and institution en-
gaged in national security objective" {Ref. 110J Mikhail
Agursky and Hannes Adomeit defines military industrial complex
as the formation of groups, both in and outside the govern-
ment, who share a common purpose of concern over defense
matters [Ref. 11] . David Holloway maintains that a military-
industrial complex represents in the Western sense an "align-
ment between military and industrial interests" which then
operates in the interest group environment [Ref. 112]
.
In a less restricted manner Vernon Aspaturian defines
military-industrial complex as a continuum between two poles.
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On one pole is the military industrial complex, defined in
the broadest terms, which suggests "a deliberate and sym-
biotic sharing of interests on the part of the military
establishment, industry and high ranking political figures,
whose collective influence is sufficient to shape decision
to accord with the interests of these groups." The other
pole is the narrower concept of a military-industrial complex
Aspaturian defines this pole in terms of interlocking organi-
zational structure of personnel that functions to a high
degree as a single unit. He maintains, "In a more re-
stricted sense, the concept implies an interlocking and
interdependent structure of interests among military,
industrial, and political figures, that enables or impels
them to behave as a distinctive political actor separate
from its individual components." The two poles establish the
theoretical boundaries of a military industrial complex with
the realistic existence of a military industrial complex in
any nation state being somewhere along the continuum [Ref.
113] .
Accepting Aspaturian' s continuum as a reference point,
the physical components of the Soviet military-industrial
complex will be discussed followed by an evaluation of the
complex's influence within the decision-making process. The
physical components of the complex consist of four elements;
the armed forces, defense industries and related research
and development institutions, heavy industry, and the




The armed forces consist of the Ministry of Defense and
all subordinate institutions. These institutions include the
Main Military Council, the General Staff, the uniformed
branches of the military, and the special directorates [Ref.
114]. The administrative structure of the military is
staffed with professional military personnel [Ref. 115]
.
Though the current Minister of Defense, Dmitri Ustinov, is a
civilian, he is one of the few ministers that has not been
a professional military officer. Civilian control of the
military is primarily exercised through party and government
organs. Within the military, the main political administration
functions as a parallel command structure and party watchdog.
Externally, the Ministry of Defense is subordinate to the
Council of Ministers, while the Minister of Defense is a
member of the Party's Central Committee and therefore directly
accountable to the Party [Ref. 116]
.
The inter-relation of ties between the military, Govern-
ment, Party, and industry are complex. The Government,
in the Council of Ministers is responsible for implementing
Party decisions. Though the Ministry of Defense is subordinate
to the Council of Ministers, actual control runs direct
between the Politburo and Defense Council to the Ministry
of Defense. The Council of Ministers primary interface with
the defense sector is through their control of the resource
allocation mechanism. The Council oversees GOSPLAN, the
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primary economic coordinating body in the Soviet centralized
economy. In theory, GOSPLAN determines and manages resource
allocation throughout the economy; commercial and defense.
In reality, the secretive nature of the defense establishment
and its position as the sole military expertise below the
top party officials changes its relationship with GOSPLAN.
Within GOSPLAN, the military requirements are handled by a
special Military Directorate. The GOSPLAN Military Direc-
torate receives its direction from the Military Industrial
Commission (VPK) which functions as the primary coordinating
body for military research, development and production.
The VPK is a working commission of the Council of Ministers
with representatives of the Ministries of Defense, specific
military industries, GOSPLAN and probably the Central Com-
mittee Secretariat. The Military-industrial Commission
directs and manages the industrial defense sector but does
not set policy. Policy is set in the Politburo, Defense
Council, and General Staff [Ref . 11 7J . The military, through
the party, can dictate defense requirements to the Government
mechanisms.
Military ties with industry are maintained at all levels.
Professional military representatives are present in defense
production plants and research, institutions . These repre-
sentatives are responsible to the military and are accountable
under criminal law to provide on-site review of production
quotas and quality control. Initial requests for new weapons
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and the number needed usually emanates from the services
themselves and moves up the Ministry of Defense chain then
over to the industrial side. The military, through Party
representation, is able to influence decisions at the top
policy making bodies and then monitor the implementation
through its on-site representatives.
The Party and military inter-relate at various levels.
As mentioned earlier, the main Political Administration within
the military form a parallel structure to monitor affairs.
Military personnel also belong to the Party. Vernon
Aspaturian in 19 72 put military Party membership at one
million [Ref . 118] . Thirdly, military members of the Party
are represented in Party institutions. Dmitri Ustinov is on
the Politburo and military members are representatives on the
Central Committee and Congress.
Overall, the military has some unique inroads to the
decision-making process. The military has representatives
in the defense industrial sector monitoring developments.
This provides unique ties between the consumer, the military,
and the supplier industry. Shortages of skilled workers or
quality resource inputs can be addressed directly to the
military and consequently to the Party decision-making
process without going through the normal Gosplan bureaucracy.
The defense sector, as such, functions as an economy on its
own. The increased technical sophistication of military
affairs and the secrecy of defense matters within the Soviet
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Union further increases the power of the military as the
primary authority on national defense matters. While exper-
tise gives the military access organizationally to the
decision-making process. Party affiliation and representation




The Defense Industries can be broken down into nine
ministries.
1. Ministry of Defense Industry—conventional weapons
2. Ministry of Aviation Industry—aircraft, engines,
parts, missiles
3. Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry--ships and
submarines
4. Ministry of Electronics Industry—electronic
components
5. Ministry of Radio Industry--electronic products
6. Ministry of Medium Machine Building—nuclear weapons
7. Ministry of General Machine Building--ballistic
missiles
8. Ministry of Machine Building—ammunition
9
.
Ministry of the Means of Communication-'-telecommuni-
cations equipment. [Ref. 119]
Other Ministries may provide subcomponents or raw
materials but these nine are the primary defense industries.
Two main points are relevant for this study concerning the
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defense industries. First, the defense industries have a
special status within the Soviet economy, and second, the
incremental innovative nature of the industries
.
The special status of the defense industry, referred to
by Vernon Aspaturian as an economy In an economy, exists due
to fundamental asymmetries between its structure and market




In his analysis Stanley Cohn maintains that the com-
mercial Soviet economy is a "Chronic sellers market." The
consumer has no real feedback loop into the system, and
therefore must accept what is provided. In the defense indus-
tries the consumer is the military who through the presence
of plant, R&D institution representatives, and political power
over the GOSPLAN mechanism, does have a feedback loop. The
defense ministries must be responsive to their sole customer,
the military. Second, Cohn demonstrates that in light of the
need for the defense industries to be responsive, they are
given greater flexibility in managerial control. The de-
fense producers are assured of access to top quality skilled
labor and necessary resources. The defense production
ministries have direct control over the R&D institution
affiliated with their concerns. Concerning managerial incen-
tive Cohn argues "managerial bonuses amply reward defense
production risk takers, because bonuses are structured to
favor production of new products rather than stressing
continued output of products of proved technological content"




Over the last 10 years, they say, several trends have
developed. They note that the scope of basic research
aimed at military objectives has been expanded. They
also point to a greater Soviet emphasis on using ad-
vances in one technology to offset deficiencies in another,
a new willingness to take risks to achieve significant
advances through speculative technological approaches,
and an integrated approach to the use of new materials
and fabrication technology to produce more sophisticated
equipment. [Ref. 122]
Within the centralized Soviet economy, the defense
industry operates by a different set of rules and incentives
than the commercial economy. As Conn notes, the special
status of the defense industry is a major factor in the
innovativeness shown in Soviet arms production. Though Cohn
is correct that the defense industries are more innovative
relative to the rest of the Soviet economy, there are still
limits imposed by the reward system. The defense industrial
managers are rewarded for taking risks, but not for failing.
A system has developed encouraging incremental innovation,
or risk, that tends to push technological progress but within
certain limits. The managers are willing to take risks to
receive the bonus, but not so great a risk as to jeopardize
their position. In reviewing the Soviet decision-making
process on new weapons systems, Arthur Alexander concludes:
The dual-approval path encourages conservatism.
Assent is most probable for a design resembling one
previously approved. Deep rooted feelings has the
decision in favor of those weapons that have been
established in manufacturing, accepted by the com-
mands, and operated by the troops. If such a
weapon can be improved, the process favors keeping
it going. [Ref. 123]
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Innovation relative to the commercial economy exists, but
only in incremental steps. U.S. defense analysts note:
A fighter, the MIG-23 for example, incorporates
the technology proven in older aircraft plus modifica-
tions, the 'risk factor, ' introduced to need specifi-
cations laid down by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
These specifications might include an engine capable
of a speed 100 miles an hour faster than present
engines
.
As an example of the way Soviet designers incor-
porate proven technology in new aircraft, Pentagon
sources point to the basic design, including the tri-
angular grouping of the main spar, leading edge spar
and the wing root rub, that has been used in all
swept wing aircraft since the MIG-15 of the late
1940's. [Ref. 124]
The incremental innovation coupled with the special
status of the defense industries and their bonus system
help explain Soviet arms development. Aircraft, tanks, and
ships have shown varied designs but all based upon the
previous generation. The producers and designers have in-
centive to improve the designs but not to create radically
new equipment. Once a design is proven, then the production
rights and upgrade in technology is sought by the defense
industrialists. This fits Michael Checinski's earlier alle-
gations that the Soviets only transfer obsolete weapons
production capabilities to Eastern Europe. The higher
bonuses are received in the modern arms sector. As a new
system is proved and developed, Soviet manufacturers switch
to the production of new equipment leaving Eastern Europe





The importance of heavy industry lies in its position as
a primary supplier of raw material to the defense industries.
As David Holloway notes, Soviet armaments development began
under the Stalinist model of economic growth which empha-
sized heavy "industry over the rest of the economy [Ref . 125]
.
Heavy industry was seen as the basis for military and there-
fore political power in the international arena. After
Stalin's death and the decentralization of the economic
ministries in 1957, heavy industry lost much of its prestige
and power. Under Khrushchev and Brezhev efforts were made
to create a more equitable balance between light and heavy
industry. According to Vernon Aspaturian, Khrushchev's efforts
fell short of desires:
While the managers of heavy industry were no longer
sufficiently powerful to arrest or resist Khrushchev's
policies by themselves, the traditional association
between heavy industry and a large military establish-
ment, and the traditional association between the
latter and national security, is so havitual that the
interests of the managers were in fact being defended
and promoted by the military and the conservative faction
in the (Party) apparatus. iRef. 126]
Seemingly, the Brezhenv period also failed to overcome
the heavy industry-military-party conservative faction con-
nection. This exerpt from a Soviet article in 19 77 concern-
ing heavy industry and consumer goods demonstrates problems
still exist:
However, hidden behind the pleasing average
indicators for consumer goods release are lagging
branches and enterprises which have paid little atten-
tion to consumer goods production, some of which do
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not produce them at all. This situation is generally
explained as an alleged 'concern' for basic production:
specialization is needed, they say, there needs to be
a change-over to the release of other output, and so
forth. But these words frequently conceal an opinion
that consumer goods mean extra trouble and worry.
There are still enterprises which year in and year
out are unable to find the necessary consumer goods
models, others which make what is simplest and easi-
est in order to avoid troubling themselves, still
others who refer to a lack of production area, the
load basic output puts on the enterprises, and so forth.
There is generally no lack of reasons of all sorts.
As a result, the proportion of cultural, personal-
services and household items in the total gross output
of individual branches is very insignificant. It
does not exceed 2 percent in the case of the Ministry
of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, the
Ministry of Construction, Road and Municipal Machine
Building, and Ministry of Power Machine Building. It
was noted at the October (19 76) Plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee that, of the 19 industrial ministries,
only five fulfilled their assignments for group 'B'
output production in the last five-year plan.
[Ref. 127]
The impression is that the heavy industrial sector is still
primarily concerned with its traditional customer; the
military. There is still a large split between the heavy
industrial sector and light industry. The managers of heavy
industry are entrenched, have strong allies of common
purpose, and are not readily amicable to change.
G. CONSERVATIVE WING OF THE PARTY
The existence of a conservative wing of the party which
can translate the views of the military, defense industry,
and heavy industry into policy is essential for the con-
cept of a military industrial complex to have relevance in
the Soviet Union. The components for a complex exist but
110

it's their ability to affect policy that determines its
position on Vernon Aspaturian's continuum. In the Soviet
Union, the only way to consistently affect policy is through
the top echelons of the Party.
The heart of the view that separate factions exist
within the decision-making bodies of the Soviet Communist
Party rests on the bureaucratic paradigm concept. The
bureaucratic paradigm has been defined by Jiri Valenta in
these terms:
Soviet foreign policy actions, like those of other
states, do not result from a single actor (the govern-
ment) rationally maximizing national security or any
other value. Instead, these actions result from a
process of political interaction ('pulling and hauling')
among several actors— in this case, the senior decision-
making and the heads of several bureaucratic organi-
zations, the members of the politburo, and the bureaucratic
elites at the Central Committee level. Bureaucratic
politics is seen as based upon and reflecting the
division of labor and responsibility for various areas
of policy among the politburo members. This division
arises from two historical conditions characteristic
of the post-Stalin era: (1) a highly developed
bureaucratic political system and (2) a collective
leadership within which no single leader possesses
sufficient power or wisdom to decide (or willingness
to accept responsibility for) all important policy
issues. [Ref. 128]
Within the bureaucratic paradigm, the primary decision-
making body, the politburo, consists of various coalitions.
The power of a particular Politburo member, rests on the
power and cohesiveness of his coalition. The succession to
power and consolidation of power is determined by a leader's




Support for the bureaucratic paradigm among many
Sovietologists is high. Jiri Valenta in his study of the
Soviet intervention of the bureaucratic paradigm in Soviet
decision making [Ref . 129] . David Holloway, though stating
source material is difficult to obtain on the subject,
implies that the military-industrial complex exists as
part of the bureaucratic coalitions. He states:
Furthermore, it is essential to ask how that struc-
tural framework fits into the social system as a whole,
in order to understand how it reproduces itself. The
Soviet armaments complex should be seen not as a military-
industrial complex in the sense of an alignment between
military and industrial interests, but rather as part
of a bureaucratic complex in which various groups,
coalitions and departments interact and form alliances
in the pursuit of particular policies. This is not
to deny that cleavages exist, but to suggest that the
armaments complex should be viewed as a bureaucracy
rather than as a field for interest group activity
.
[Ref. 130]
William Odom in his study of the Soviet military-Party
connection ties the bureaucratic politics directly to the
Party. Odom states: "the military is an administrative
arm of the party, not something separate from and competing
with it. When there are cleavages in the leadership over
military policy, they are intraparty factional divisions,
not divisions of party vs. military" {Ref. 131]
.
H. CONCLUSION
Within the Soviet Union, the military, the defense
industrial, heavy industries, and a segment of the party
share a commonality of interests. This commonality of
interest is far from functioning as a single unit as an
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Aspaturian continuum. But the commonality of interests and
interlocking reliance for power is enough to maintain the
existence of a military industrial complex that influences
policy within the Soviet Union.
Soviet internal politics affecting arms transfer policy
to Eastern Europe is not new. Thomas Wolfe maintains that
the initial modernization of Eastern Europe forces by
Khrushchev was partially due to internal forces. Khrushchev,
trying to decrease the size and influence of the large Soviet
ground forces, modernized the non-Soviet WTO forces main-
taining that in the nuclear age that the East European
armies could provide a higher portion of the conventional
forces. Though the maneuver did not decrease Soviet forces,
his burden sharing concepts did help modernize East European
forces [Ref. 132].
Currently, Andropov's position is based on the national
security coalition, or in effect, the military-industrial
coalition. This is not to say that it is a military coali-
tion, but- a coalition of forces consisting of Party, industry,
and military elements. The Party, and Party control, is
preeminent but concessions have to be made in policy goals
to the other elements to maintain the coalition. These
policy goals would also include the national security aspect
of arms transfer to Eastern Europe.
The imperative from the industrial sector is first to
maintain production, and bonuses, by modernizing Eastern
Europe. The cost, or expended resources, is irrelevant
113

since the incentive system is based upon production. Second,
restrict production of modern equipment to Soviet industry.
Again, bonuses are maximized by producing the most current
arms. Once a new generation is produced then the license
for the prior generation can be passed to Eastern Europe.
The military imperative rests on the reliability of
Eastern Europe as discussed in Section III. The military
views Eastern Europe primarily as a means of strategic
access and secondly as a buffer zone. They want Eastern
Europe armed capabilities equal to her reliability. In
reality this means that short of the development of a supra-
national military establishment under Soviet control, Eastern





Chapter I demonstrated that a prime Soviet rationale in
arms transfers is to prevent the development of indigenous
national defense industries in East European nations. The
transfers are not meant only to influence through dependence
on equipment, but also through the maximization of the Soviet
ability to intervene. With limited means of national defense
available to the East European states, the massive Soviet
military power can be successfully transformed into political
influence. Decisions can not be made in the East European
capitals without taking into consideration Soviet desires
and the possibility of Soviet military action.
Chapter II demonstrated that, though the East European
armies are not equal in status with their Soviet counter-
parts, they do fulfill a military function within the WTO.
Their role in WTO doctrine is a function of reliability and
political stability. The greater the internal support of
the regime and the greater its ability to define national
interests in terms of Soviet "socialist internationalism,
"
the greater its reliability in Soviet eyes. As the neces-
essity for exerting influence through coercive means, as
analyzed in Chapter II, diminishes the Soviet desire to
maximize the military effectiveness of Eastern European armies
increases. Modernization thus becomes an instrument to give
115

Eastern Europe the military capabilities to realistically
represent an accretion to Soviet power. Current Soviet
policy of maintaining East Europe one generation behind
Soviet military forces is probably the maximum extent of
acceptable modernization. Modernization on an equal level
with Soviet forces would require complete integration of WTO
forces into a supra-national force under Soviet control.
As it stands, the East European forces do carry out a credi-
ble defensive role within the WTO.
Chapter III discredits the principal economic factors
as defined by Kemp and Miller, and demonstrates imperatives
peculiar to the Soviet political-economic system. Soviet
armament industries are not independent institutions working
within a market economy where profit is a prime motivator.
The industries are state-owned and a part of the military
industrial complex whose commonality of interests with politi-
cal factions translates into political influence. The status
of individuals in defense and heavy industry, and therefore
their access to the reward system, is a function of the
relative importance of defense and military power to the
political hierarchy. Eastern Europe, an arms market defined
as a national defense imperative, helps legitimize the neces-
sity for a large defense sector. The commonality of interests
between national Security-oriented party factions, the
military, and defense-related industries facilitates the
translation of military and industrial defense sector de-
sires into Soviet national policy.
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Soviet policies, manifest in arms tranfer programs
toward Eastern Europe, revolve around maintenance and ex-
ploitation. Of primary concern is the maintenance of Eastern
y Europe as a defensive buffer zone, offensive springboard,
and ideological bloc under Soviet leadership. The desire
to exploit the military and industrial potential of Eastern
Europe is secondary. Both the CMEA and WTO function to
coordinate and control East European military and industrial
capabilities as a subcomponent of the Soviet Union's. In
both cases, control is exerted to insure that developing
East European capabilities only augment Soviet assets and
cannot compete. In light of this, two general inferences
can be made about the Soviet-East European arms connection:
1. Short of the development of a supra-national WTO force
under Soviet control, WTO modernization is currently at a
high point. The development of internal problems, as in
Poland, increases uncertainties as to reliability and will
therefore slow Soviet modernization efforts in the specific
countries affected by such problems.
2. Eastern European defense industrial capabilities,
short of complete integration by CMEA, will always be minimal
The Soviets for both national security and internal economic
imperatives will retain the role of predominant supplier.
No industries will be allowed to develop that can compete
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